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Abstract
We present a model of stereotypes in which a decision maker assessing a group recalls
only that group’s most representative or distinctive types. Stereotypes highlight differences
between groups, and are especially inaccurate (consisting of unlikely, extreme types) when
groups are similar. Stereotypical thinking exhibits base rate neglect, but also confirmation
bias: beliefs overreact to information that confirms the stereotype and ignore information
that contradicts it. Stereotypes can change if new information changes the group’s most
distinctive trait. Applied to gender stereotypes, the model provides a unified account of
disparate evidence regarding the gender gap in education and in labor markets.
∗Royal Holloway and University of London, Universitá Bocconi and IGIER, Harvard University. We are
grateful to Nick Barberis, Roland Bénabou, Dan Benjamin, Tom Cunningham, Matthew Gentzkow, Emir
Kamenica, Larry Katz, David Laibson, Sendhil Mullainathan, Josh Schwartzstein, Jesse Shapiro, Alp Simsek
and Neil Thakral for extremely helpful comments.
1 Introduction
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a stereotype as a “widely held but fixed and oversim-
plified image or idea of a particular type of person or thing”. Stereotypes are ubiquitous.
Among other things, they cover racial groups (“Asians are good at math”), political groups
(“republicans are rich”), genders (“male drivers are aggressive”), demographic groups (“Florida
residents are elderly”), and activities (“flying is dangerous”). Stereotypes play an important
cognitive role. Psychologists define them as “. . .mental representations of real differences
between groups [. . . ] allowing easier and more efficient processing of information. Stereo-
types are selective, however, in that they are localized around group features that are the
most distinctive, that provide the greatest differentiation between groups, and that show the
least within-group variation” (Hilton and von Hippel 1996). While stereotypes allow for a
quick and intuitive assessment of groups, they may also cause distorted judgment and biased
behavior, such as discrimination and inter-group conflict. The nature of stereotypes is not
completely understood and there are many open questions: How do stereotypes form? How
do they affect beliefs and actions? Why do some stereotypes have a reasonable amount of
validity (“men are aggressive drivers”), while others have much less (“Florida residents are
elderly ”)? How do stereotypes change?
We present a psychologically motivated model in which stereotypes are simplified repre-
sentations of reality, consisting of features or types that automatically come to mind when
thinking about a group. Psychologists have proposed several factors that shape which types
come to mind and become stereotypes. These include representativeness, likelihood, and
availability of types (e.g., due to media coverage). We focus on representativeness. We build
on Gennaioli and Shleifer’s (GS, 2010) model of the representativeness heuristic, in which
a group’s representative types are those that most distinguish it from other groups. This
approach views the core of stereotyping as drawing differences among groups, and captures
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972) notion that “an attribute is representative of a class if it is
very diagnostic; that is, the relative frequency of this attribute is much higher in that class
than in a relevant reference class.”
Formally, we assume that a type t is representative for group G if it is diagnostic of G
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relative to a comparison group−G, in that the likelihood ratio Pr(G|t)/Pr(−G|t) is large. To
explore the role of representativeness in the simplest setting, we assume that, due to limited
working memory, only the most representative types are recalled and used in judgments,
be it for inference or for prediction. The stereotype of G is thus formed by truncating the
true probability distribution Pr(t|G) of group G to its d ≥ 1 most representative types.
Non-representative types are neglected.
Relative to a Bayesian, distortions in beliefs can be drastic, particularly when the types
that come to mind are not the most likely ones. To illustrate this logic, consider the formation
of the stereotype “Florida residents are elderly”. The proportion of elderly people in Florida
and in the overall US population is shown in the table below.1
age 0− 18 19− 64 65+
Florida 20.7% 61.1% 18.2%
US 23.5% 62.8% 13.7%
The table shows that the most representative type of a Florida resident is someone
over 65, because this age bracket maximizes Pr(Florida|t)/Pr(US|t). However, and perhaps
surprisingly, only about 18% of Florida residents are elderly. The vast majority of Florida
residents, nearly as many as in the overall US population, are in the age bracket “19-64”,
which maximizes Pr(t|Florida). Being elderly is not the most likely age bracket for Florida
residents, but rather the age bracket that occurs with the highest relative frequency. A
stereotype-based prediction that a Florida resident is elderly has very little validity.
We think of stereotypes as quick intuitive representations of a group, which come to
mind from memory in particular situations. Some stereotypes are inconsequential. A driver
being cut off on the road might form a quick gender or age stereotype of the aggressor, but
then quickly drive on and forget about it. But stereotypical thinking can also have substan-
tial consequences. Graduate admission officers scanning dozens of files might reject foreign
candidates who bring to mind ethnic stereotypes and accept potentially less talented candi-
dates with A’s from Ivy League schools. Girls avoiding STEM majors because they perceive
themselves as being worse than boys in math face lower earnings and possibly less satisfy-
1See http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12000.html.
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ing careers. We do not suggest that decision makers are uniformly bound to stereotypical
thinking in all situations; rather that it requires substantial cost and deliberation to enrich
one’s mental representations, and even deliberation may not fully overcome the influence of
stereotypes.
The focus on representativeness yields the following insights and predictions:
• Because stereotypes emphasise differences between groups, they are generally too ex-
treme relative to the groups’ true underlying characteristics. Stereotypes are partic-
ularly inaccurate (recalling unlikely types) when groups are fairly similar and differ
only in the tails. Our theory thus explains why stereotypes are often unlikely, as in
the Florida example.
• Because stereotypes rely on limited recall of types, they may also minimize variability
within groups. Informally, stereotypes minimize variability within groups whose dis-
tinguishing characteristic is just one heavy tail (or low variance); stereotypes enhance
variability within groups with high variance, in which both tails are heavy.
• Stereotypes can exhibit a specific form of neglect of base rates which is distinct from –
and yields different predictions than – the approach in which the impact of base-rates
on Bayesian updates is dampened.
• Stereotypes distort reaction to information. So long as stereotypes do not change,
people display a form of confirmation bias in that they over-react to information con-
sistent with stereotypes, and under-react or even ignore information inconsistent with
stereotypes. Thus, representativeness based recall generates both base-rate neglect and
confirmation bias.
• Stereotypes change – or rather, are replaced – if sufficient contrary information is re-
ceived (e.g. observing more women than men studying math), or if an entirely different
feature becomes more representative (e.g. observing many Black athletes). A change
of stereotypes then leads to a drastic reevaluation of already available data. However,
more information does not necessarily lead to a better (more likely) stereotype.
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Since Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972, 1973) work on heuristics and biases, several stud-
ies have formally modelled heuristics about probabilistic judgments and incorporated them
into economic models. Work on the confirmation bias (Rabin and Schrag 1999) and on
probabilistic extrapolation (Grether 1980, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998, Rabin 2002,
Rabin and Vayanos 2010, Benjamin, Rabin and Raymond 2011) assumes that the DM has
an incorrect model in mind or incorrectly processes available data. Our approach is instead
based on the single assumption that only representative information comes to mind when
making judgments. Our model describes a specific mental operation – namely, generating a
prediction for the distribution of types in a group, based on data stored in memory – and
in this context it captures instances of base-rate neglect and confirmation bias as described
above. Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) show that representativeness based thinking can ac-
count for other well-known violations of the laws of probability, including the well known
conjunction bias (the “Linda” problem) and disjunction bias.
The neglect of information in our model simplifies judgment problems in a way related
to models of categorization (Mullainathan 2002, Fryer and Jackson 2008). In these models,
however, DMs use coarse categories organized according to likelihood, not representativeness.
This approach generates imprecision but does not create a systematic bias for overestimating
unlikely events, nor does it allow for a role of context in shaping assessments. Our emphasis
on representative and distinctive features or types is closely related to our previous work on
salience (BGS 2012, 2013). Stereotypes also play a role in models of statistical discrimination
(Arrow 1973, Phelps 1972). In these models, stereotypes fill up for the lack of information
about agents, but equilibrium stereotypes are accurate on average. In our model, stereotypes
can be highly inaccurate. Our model also allows us to explore the role of self-stereotypes,
namely beliefs about oneself that are influenced by group membership and across-group
comparisons, with potentially important economic consequences.
In Section 5 we connect our work to a recent literature on the role of beliefs and preferences
in gender stereotypes, particularly in the context of math performance (Goldin, Katz and
Kuziemko 2006, Niederle and Vesterlund 2011, Bertrand 2011). Our model reconciles two
seemingly puzzling features of the data. First, women are less confident and more reluctant to
compete in math tasks against men even though the distribution of math performance is very
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similar acrosss genders. We argue this is due to women having an inaccurate, negative self-
stereotype, which arises from men being over-represented at the highest levels of performance.
Second, stereotypes are context dependent: women are confident when competing in single
sex tournaments or in stereotypically neutral subjects, such as verbal tasks, Art History and
Pop Culture (Coffman, 2014). In these subjects women perform at least as well as men,
leading to a positive self-stereotype.
In the next section, we introduce the notion of representativeness in the context of cat-
egorical (discrete) distributions and describe our model. We explore the forces that shape
stereotypes and their accuracy. In Section 3, we describe how stereotypes can cause both
under- and over-reaction to new information. Section 4 extends the analysis to continuous
distributions. Section 5 applies the model to develop a theory of gender stereotypes. Section
6 extends the model to account for the role of likelihood in recall. Section 7 concludes.
Appendix A contains the proofs. In Appendices B and C we consider the cases of unordered
types and multidimensional types, respectively.
2 A Model of Representativeness and Stereotypes
2.1 The Model
A decision maker (DM) faces a prediction problem, which entails representing the distribution
of types t in a group G. The DM may be assessing the ability of a job candidate coming from
a certain ethnic group, the future performance of a firm belonging to a certain sector, or
his future earnings based on his own educational background. The DM solves this problem
by forming a simplified representation of G, which relies on recalling from memory only the
most representative types of group G relative to an alternative group −G.2
Formally, the DM must assess the distribution of a categorical random variable T in a
2Our model is concerned with the specific mental operation of recalling the conditional distribution of
types t given G, which is stored in memory. We do not consider the related operation of inference, namely
of determining the probability that G vs −G is true. Gennaioli and Shleifer (GS, 2010) offer a model of
representativeness-based inference, in which DMs assess a hypothesis by recalling only its most representative
scenarios relative to the alternative hypothesis. In GS (2010), scenario t is more representative of hypothesis
G against an alternative −G if, conditional on t, G is more likely to be true than −G. This is closely related
to our Definition 1 below.
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group G, which is a proper subset of the entire population Ω. The random variable T takes
values in a type space {t1, . . . , tN} that is naturally ordered, with t1 < . . . < tN (and in many
examples is assumed to be cardinal). In the examples of the introduction, G is male, or a
Florida resident, or firms, while types are assertiveness, age, or stock returns.3 We denote
by pit,G the true conditional probability Pr(T = t|G) of type t in group G and by pit the true
unconditional probability Pr(T = t) of type t in Ω.
The DM has stored in memory the full conditional distribution (pit,G)t∈{t1,...,tN}, but he
assesses this distribution by recalling only a limited and selected set of types. Recall is
limited in that the DM recalls only a subset of d ∈ {1, . . . , N} types. When d = 1, memory
limits are so severe that the DM recalls only one type for G. When d = N , there are no
memory limits, and the DM recalls all possible types for G. Recall is selective in that, for
given d < N , the recalled types are the most representative of group G, in the sense that they
are most diagnostic of G relative to other groups in Ω. Following GS (2010), we formalize
representativeness as follows.
Definition 1 The representativeness of type t for group G is defined as R(t, G) = Pr(G|T =
t)/Pr(−G|T = t), where −G = Ω\G. Bayes’ rule implies that representativeness increases
in the likelihood ratio:
Pr(T = t|G)
Pr(T = t| −G) =
pit,G
pit,−G
. (1)
A type t is representative of group G if, after observing t, a Bayesian DM is more
confident that the type is drawn from G relative to its complement −G. Put differently,
type t is representative of G if it is diagnostic about G in this sense. This notion captures
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972) intuition, whereby a type t is representative of G if it is
relatively more likely to occur in G than in −G. When thinking about the age distribution
of Floridians, our minds find it easy to retrieve those age brackets that are relatively more
common in Florida, as compared to the rest of the US population.
3The model applies also to cases in which types are not ordered, representing for instance occupations,
or when they are multi-dimensional, capturing a bundle of attributes such as occupation and nationality.
We return to these possibilities in Appendices B and C respectively. Also, G may represent any category of
interest, such as the historical performance of a firm or industry, actions available to a decision maker (T =
set of payoffs, G = occupations), or categories in the natural world (T = ability to fly, G = birds).
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Definition 1 leads to the following property.
Remark 1 Suppose that pit,G ≥ pit,−G. Then, the representativeness of type t for group G:
i) increases, for given baseline probability pit,−G, in the difference (pit,G − pit,−G).
ii) decreases, for given difference pit,G − pit,−G, in the baseline probability pit,−G.
Our DMs are attuned to log differences in probabilities:4 property i) says that a type
is more representative the more likely it is to occur under G than under −G, and property
ii) captures a form of diminishing sensitivity, whereby a given probability difference is more
attended to when it occurs in a relatively unlikely type of a group G. This is because such
types can be very diagnostic.
The DM’s assessment of the distribution of types over G works as follows.
Definition 2 Denote by r ∈ {1, . . . , N} the representativeness ranking of types, and denote
by t(r) the r-th most representative type for G. The DM forms his beliefs according to the
modified probability distribution:
pistt(r),G =

pit(r),G∑d
r′=1 pit(r′),G
, for r ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
0 otherwise.
(2)
Because representativeness drives recall, the DM’s beliefs about G consist of a truncated
probability distribution on the d most representative types (ties are resolved randomly). In
this way, diagnosticity of types shapes the DM’s predictions about G, even though diagnos-
ticity is normatively irrelevant for prediction tasks. We call the distribution (pistt(r),G)r=1,...,d
the stereotype for G (where st stands for stereotype), and sometimes refer to the repre-
sented types, {t1, . . . , td}, as the stereotype for G. These are the types that are at the “top
of mind.” The (N − d) least representative types are at the back of mind and are neglected
by the DM. These less representative types are not viewed as impossible; they are just as-
signed zero probability in the DM’s current thinking. This formulation allows us to model
4This feature connects to our previous work on salience, which also builds on Weber’s law. In BGS (2012)
we postulated that, in a choice among two lotteries, a lottery outcome is more salient when it entails: i)
a larger payoff difference (ordering), and ii) a lower payoff level (diminishing sensitivity). Remark 1 shows
that here these same properties characterize recall in the domain of probabilistic types.
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surprises or reactions to zero probability events, which we come back to in Section 3. The
other properties of the model, however, would continue to hold under a smoother neglect of
non-representative types.5
In the extreme case where d = 1, the DM recalls only group G’s most representative
type t(1), which psychologists call the exemplar, and assigns it probability pistt(1),G = 1. In
less extreme, and perhaps more realistic cases, d > 1 and the stereotype of G includes the
exemplar and some less representative types. When thinking about Floridians, people think
about not only retired baby boomers, but also college students.
Stereotypes depend on true probabilities. Equation (2) implies that, conditional on
coming to mind, the assessed odds ratios of any two types is consistent with the DM’s
experience and information. Past experience or information about types is stored in the
DM’s long-term memory and thus, conditional on coming to mind, shapes assessments. Since
past experiences or information may vary across individuals, our model allows for individual
heterogeneity in stereotypes, driven for instance by culture (see Section 5).
2.2 Discussion of Assumptions
Implementing Definition 1 of representativeness raises two important issues: i) what is the
set of types T considered by the DM, and ii) what is the comparison group −G.
Any prediction problem specifies the group G and a possibly coarse version of the type
space T . Often, the problem itself provides a natural specification of T as well as of the
comparison group −G. This is the case in the empirically important class of “closed end"
questions, such as those used in surveys, which provide respondents with a set of alternatives.
More generally, when, as we assume here, types have a natural order (such as income, age,
education), T is also naturally given by the problem (income, age and years of schooling
5To formalize smooth discounting, consider a weighting function δ(pit,G/pit,−G) that is increasing in the
likelihood ratio (i.e., δ′(·) > 0). Then, the probability of type t under the stereotype is defined to be:
pistt,G =
δ(pit,G/pit,−G) · pik,G∑
k δ(pik,G/pik,−G) · pik,G
In this formulation, the probability of types that have a higher representativeness ratio is inflated. This
smooth formulation is more appropriate in those cases where there are only a few relevant types, such as
when the DM’s assessment naturally divides a group into two broad types (e.g. people on welfare vs people
not on welfare).
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brackets). Other settings may not automatically prime a natural set of types. For exam-
ple, suppose a person is asked to guess the typical occupation of a democratic voter in an
“open ended” format (without being provided with a set of alternatives). Here the level of
granularity at which types are defined is not obvious (e.g. teacher vs a university teacher vs
a professor of comparative literature).6 Psychologists have sought for years to construct a
theory of natural types (Rosch 1998). We do not make a contribution to this problem.
The second question raised by Definition 1 is that of the comparison group, or equivalently
the set of possible groups Ω (given that −G = Ω\G). The comparison group −G captures the
context in which a stereotype is formed and, again, is often implied by the problem: when
G = Floridians, −G =Rest of US population; when G = Black Americans, −G =White
Americans. Sometimes there are several natural comparison groups and the specification
of Ω can influence the stereotype for G. For example, the stereotype of college athletes in
the population of all college students might be “below average academic”, but in comparison
to professional athletes it might be “not very strong.”7 In experiments or in surveys, the
explicit manipulation of Ω allows researchers to test whether stereotypes are indeed context
dependent, which is a new prediction of our model. We do not have a theory of what
determines Ω when it is not pinned down by the problem itself (though the specification
of G provides natural bounds for Ω, e.g. when G is a social group, Ω is a larger subset of
mankind). In these cases, to derive testable predictions from representativeness, one can take
Ω to be the natural population over which types are distributed in the underlying Bayesian
model.
At a broader level, in our model stereotypes are simplified mental representations of
groups characterized by selective recall of those groups’ types. Our emphasis on represen-
tativeness implies that a stereotype exaggerates the distinctive traits of the group it repre-
sents, consistent with the social psychology of stereotyping (Hilton and Hippel 1996). One
interesting issue, which we do not tackle in this paper, is whether representativeness-based
6Strictly speaking, this is also an issue when types are ordered. However, in contrast to non-ordered
categories where granularity is of central importance (professor of comparative literature is very different
from professor of business administration), in ordered categories distributions are typically smoother, so
changing the bracketing has minor effects on estimates. In some settings, such distributions have natural
bracketing, such as in educational attainment.
7As this example suggests, the type space T can in general have multiple dimensions. In Appendix C, we
explore stereotype formation in this case, and in particular which dimension becomes stereotypical.
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stereotypes are optimal in some constrained sense. Because stereotypes allow DMs to quickly
detect differences across groups and situations, stereotypical thinkers are apt at detecting
the direction of a signal, even if they might exaggerate the signal’s magnitude. In a world of
noisy signals and extreme payoffs, this might be useful: when seeing the grass move in the
savannah, it may actually be optimal to instantly think about a lion even though the wind
or a lizard are much more likely.
Representativeness is not the only psychological force that shapes stereotypes. Decision
makers may for instance find it easier to recall types that are sufficiently likely. In Section
6 we formally incorporate in our model a more general mechanism driven by a combination
of representativeness and likelihood of types. Kahneman and Tversky (1972) stress that
selective recall is also shaped by availability, broadly understood as the “ease” with which
information comes to mind. This may capture likelihood but also aspects such as recency
and frequency of exposure, which might be independent of likelihood or representativeness.
For instance, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a US respondent asked about
what Arabs are like might more easily recall terrorists than Bedouins, even when there are
vastly more bedouins than terrorists among Arabs, and even though all Bedouins are Arabs,
so that Bedouins are more representative of Arabs than terrorists.8 The extension in Section
6 can also capture the role of frequency of exposure on recall, but a full model of availability
is beyond the scope of this paper (and none is readily available in the Psychology literature).
Moreover, because representativeness captures the central property that stereotypes highlight
differences among groups, representativeness is a necessary, and often sufficient, mechanism
for stereotyping.
Finally, consider the assumption that stereotypical beliefs are truncations of true distribu-
tions, Definition 2. This assumption captures the observation that in most group assessments
some non-representative types do not come to mind at all, consistent with the robust find-
8A Gallup poll conducted shortly after the 1993 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center
found that “majorities of Americans said the following terms applied to Arabs: religious (81%), ter-
rorists (59%), violent (58%) and religious fanatics (56%). Related, a recent poll by Pew’s Global
Attitudes Project found that Westerners view Muslims as fanatical (58% of respondents) and violent
(50%), while Muslims view Westerners as selfish (68%), violent (66%) and greedy (64%). Curiously,
selfishness and greed are among the traits that Westerners least associate with Muslims. Sources:
http://www.gallup.com/poll/4939/Americans-Felt-Uneasy-Toward-Arabs-Even-Before-September.aspx and
http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/07/21/muslim-western-tensions-persist/.
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ing in social psychology that stereotypes minimise within-group variability (Hilton and von
Hippel 1996). When the type space is finite, it is more tractable to assume that selective
recall operates by discarding a number of types. When t is continuous, as in Section 5, it
is more natural to think that representative types come to mind up to a certain total prob-
ability mass. The qualitative features of our model also hold under smooth discounting of
the probability of less representative types.9
2.3 Properties of Stereotypes
Some stereotypes hold a high degree of validity (e.g., men are stronger than women), while
others are widely off the mark (e.g., Florida residents are elderly). We now explore what
determines the accuracy of stereotypical beliefs in our model.
We use two approaches to evaluate whether a stereotype’s distribution (pistt,G)t=t1,...,tN
is an accurate representation of the true distribution (pit,G)t=t1,...,tN . We first consider the
extent to which stereotypes shift probability mass across types. This measure allows us
to check whether a stereotype is likely, namely if the support of the stereotype captures a
significant share of the group’s population. Formally, we consider the quadratic loss function
L =
∑
t(pi
st
t,G − pit,G)2, which captures the average discrepancy between the stereotype and
the true probability distribution. This approach allows us to assess stereotype accuracy even
in settings where types are unordered (such as the distribution of professions in a group),
and to examine in which circumstances stereotypes tend to be unlikely.
We then restrict attention to the case where types are ordered (for example, income
distributions) and consider to what extent the mean of the stereotypical distribution differs
from the true mean. This allows us to understand under which circumstances stereotypes
are extreme, in the sense of being centered around types that are at the edges of the true
support, and far from the mean type.
9Smooth discounting may be useful in those cases where there are only a few relevant types, such as when
the DM’s assessment naturally divides a group into two broad types (e.g. people on welfare vs people not
on welfare).
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2.3.1 Likely vs Unlikely Stereotypes
As measured by the quadratic loss function, stereotype accuracy depends on the relationship
between representativeness and likelihood. Accuracy is high if the stereotype includes the
types that are objectively most likely but decreases as the (recalled) representative types
become less likely. Broadly speaking, Equation (1) implies that stereotypes are likely to be
inaccurate when groups have similar distributions. For example, suppose that Pr(T = t|G)
and Pr(T = t| − G) share he same ranking across types t. In this case, if for group −G
the most representative type is the mode, then the representative type for group G is not
its mode.10 If instead the two groups have very different distributions, stereotypes tend to
be accurate. For instance, if Pr(T = t|G)and Pr(T = t| −G) have opposite rankings across
types (in the sense that the k-th most likely type for G is the k-th least likely type for −G),
then the stereotypes will be the modes for both groups.
To see these properties more clearly, consider the case in which the distribution of types
in group −G is a monotonic transformation of that in group G. In particular, suppose
that the true conditional distribution in −G is a power transformation of that in G, namely
pit,−G = pi∗ ·piαt,G for all t, where pi∗ = 1/
∑
t pi
α
t,G is a normalizing constant. In this formulation,
α controls the relationship between the likelihood ranking of types for groups G and −G.
This is shown in Figure 1, where for the sake of illustration we assume (pit,G)t=t1,...,tN is
unimodal (and approximated by a continuous distribution).
If α > 0 (panels A and B), the likelihood ranking of types for groups G and −G coincide:
the two distributions are “similar” and in particular have the same modal type. There are
two subcases : if α ∈ [0, 1) (panel B), then group G is more concentrated around its mode
and group −G has fatter tails, while if α > 1 (panel A), then group G has fatter tails and
−G is more concentrated around its mode. On the other hand, if α < 0 (panel C), then the
likelihood ranking of types for G is the opposite of that for −G. In this special case, we have
that R(t, G) ∝ pi1−αt,G while R(t,−G) ∝ piα−1t,G . That is, the representativeness ranking of types
10To see this, suppose that Pr(T = t|G) ≥ Pr(T = t′|G) if and only if Pr(T = t| −G) ≥ Pr(T = t′| −G)
for all t, t′ ∈ T . Then, if argmaxt Pr(T = t| − G) =argmaxt Pr(T = t| − G)/Pr(T = t |G ), it must be the
case (excluding ties) that argmaxt Pr(T = t|G) 6=argmaxt Pr(T = t|G)/Pr(T = t |−G ). Indeed, because
the distributions are comonotonic, the type argmaxt Pr(T = t| −G) is the model type also for G. However,
given that this type is the mostly representative for −G it is by definition the least representative for G. As
a result, the most representative type for the latter group is non-modal.
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Figure 1: Likely and unlikely stereotypes.
for G is the opposite of that for −G. Therefore, the accuracy of stereotypes for groups G and
−G critically depends on whether the two distributions have the same likelihood ranking.
Proposition 1 Let pit,−G = pi∗ · piαt,G as above. Then:
i) If α > 1, the stereotype for G is its d least likely types, while the stereotype for −G is
its d most likely types.
ii) If α ∈ [0, 1), the stereotype for G is its d most likely types, while the stereotype for
−G is its d least likely types.
iii) If α < 0, the stereotypes for G and −G are each group’s d most likely types.
Proposition 1 describes the conditions under which a group’s likely types are selected
by representativeness. Broadly speaking, when groups G and −G have the same likelihood
ranking (α > 0) then one group has an inaccurate stereotype. In Case i), which is described
in panel A of Figure 1, the stereotype for G is unlikely but that for −G is likely, because
pit,G has heavier tails than pit,−G. In case ii) (panel B), the reverse is true because pit,G is
more concentrated than pit,−G around its mode. Finally, when the groups have the opposite
likelihood ranking, as in case iii) (panel C), then the most representative types are also the
most likely types for each group.
Proposition 1 captures a sense in which comparing similar groups leads to bad stereotyp-
ing. Intuitively, the psychology of representativeness induces the DM to focus on differences
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among groups and to neglect types that are likely to occur in both groups. When common
types are infrequent, the DM neglects some variability across types but still has a reasonably
accurate mental representation of each group. However, when groups are similar, the DM
fails in two ways: as before, he neglects within group heterogeneity, but he also dispropor-
tionately recalls unlikely types. In this case, stereotypes are very inaccurate because the DM
not only perceives within group variability to be too small, but also generalizes to the entire
group a trait that may be very infrequent. This logic may help explain countless negative
stereotypes held about social groups: precisely because social groups are broadly similar,
they tend to differ in unlikely types.11
2.3.2 Extreme Stereotypes
We now turn to a second measure of stereotype accuracy, namely the discrepancy between
the average type in group G and the average type in the stereotype of G (recall that the type
space is cardinal). Representativeness implies that stereotypes are often not just unlikely,
but also extreme, in the sense of being dominated by types that are at the extremes of
the type space. To proceed, we focus on a case where the characterisation of stereotypes
is particularly simple, namely where the likelihood ratio pit,G/pit,−G is monotonic in t. The
monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) holds to first approximation in many empirical
settings (see Figure 2 and Section 5) and is also satisfied in many economic models, for
instance in canonical agency models.12 We then have:
Proposition 2 If MLRP holds, and d < N , then:
11The anthropology and psychology literatures documents that extremely negative ethnic stereotypes play
an important role in inter-group conflict (Tajfel, 1982). A central finding of this literature is the asymmetry
in valence between stereotypes about one’s own group (the in-group) and one’s stereotype about other groups
(out-groups): stereotypes of in-groups tend to be more detailed and more positive than those of out-groups
(Hilton and von Hippel 1996). Although we do not predict systematic differences between in-group and out-
group stereotypes, differences might emerge if the DM is assumed to have less accurate information about
the out-group. Moreover, the in-group/out-group asymmetry does not seem to be universally valid: in many
cases, such as in the case of gender self-stereotypes explored in Section 5, the in-group (women) may share
with the out-group (men) a negative stereotype about itself and a positive stereotype about the out-group.
12Examples include the Binomial and the Poisson families of distributions. The characterisation of distri-
butions satisfying MLRP is easier in the case of continuous distributions, see Section 4: two distributions
f(x), f(x− θ) that differ only in their mean satisfy MLRP if and only if the distribution f(x) is log-concave.
Examples include the Exponential and Normal distributions. To the extent that discrete distributions suf-
ficiently approximate these distributions (as the Poisson distribution Pois(λ) approximates the Normal
distribution N(λ, λ) for large λ), they will also satisfy MLRP.
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i) if the likelihood ratio pit,G
pit,−G
is increasing, the stereotype for G is the right tail of types
{N − d+ 1, . . . , N}. Moreover,
Est(t|G) > E(t|G) > E(t)
ii) if the likelihood ratio pit,G
pit,−G
is decreasing, the stereotype for G is the left tail of types
{1, . . . , d}. Moreover,
Est(t|G) < E(t|G) < E(t)
Intuitively, under MLRP extreme observations are most informative about – and thus
representative of – the group they come from. When MLRP holds, representative types are
located at the extremes of the distribution.13 Thus the DM’s belief about G are formed by
truncating from the original distribution the least representative tail, and focusing on the
most representative tail. This leads to three important effects.
First, the DM’s mean assessment of group G is shifted in the same direction as the true
conditional mean E (t |G) relative to the unconditional mean E (t).
Second, because his assessments are biased in the direction of the (extreme) exemplar,
the DM’s estimate of the mean type is too extreme (e.g. Est(t|G) > E(t|G) if the right
tail is representative). Indeed, the monotone likelihood ratio property implies a correlation
between types and groups: group G is relatively more associated with high (low) types if
the ratio is increasing (decreasing). It follows from Proposition 2 that stereotyping induces
the DM to overestimate this correlation.
Third, for a large class of distributions, the DM’s assessment of the variance Var(t|G) is
dampened. In particular, this can occur when one tail of the distribution is representative,
so that the decision maker neglects types in the non-stereotypical tail.14 In this case, stereo-
typing effectively leads to a form of overconfidence in which the DM both holds extreme
views and overestimates the precision of his assessment.
13Note that MLRP holds in all panels of Figure 1, so that stereotypes for both groups are indeed extreme
types. As this example illustrates, extreme types need not be unlikely.
14Formally, one can demonstrate that in this case the decision maker assesses the variance of types to be
lower than the true value Var(t|G) provided the tails of the distribution pit,G are not too heavy. The result
is easier to formalise in the continuous case in terms of log-concave distributions, see Proposition 5.
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In this respect, our model generates the property that stereotypes “provide the greatest
differentiation between groups, and [. . . ] show the least within-group variation” (Hilton and
von Hippel 1996). At the same time, our model implies that under certain conditions decision
makers can exaggerate the variability of types in a group. This case is most clearly seen for
continuous distributions (Section 4); Proposition 5 shows that stereotypes exaggerate the
variability in a group precisely when “high variability” is the group’s distinctive trait, i.e.
when the group has two heavy tails.
To illustrate the model’s predictions, consider stereotypical beliefs about income distribu-
tions of Black versus White US households. Figure 2, panel A, presents the true distributions
pit,B and pit,W obtained from the US Census Bureau.15 The types t are given by (a coarsening
of) the income bins used by the Census. The panel also presents the representativeness
pit,W/pit,B of each bin t for the White household group (solid line). Two facts stand out:
first, the distributions are broadly similar, overlapping over the entire income range; second,
higher income bins are more representative of White households, as evidenced by the fact
that the likelihood ratio is monotonically increasing in income t.
Figure 2: Income for Black and White households in the US: panel A) true distributions;
panel B) stereotypical beliefs.
15See www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p60-245.pdf, Table A-1.
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In panel B of Figure 2, we plot the stereotypical beliefs as predicted by our model,
when DMs recall only three types. Because higher income bins are more representative
of White households, stereotypes about income distributions are extreme: the stereotype
of White households truncates away the non-representative left tail of lower income, while
the stereotype of Black households truncates away the non-stereotypical right tail of higher
income. As a consequence, stereotypical thinkers overestimate the mean income of White
households, underestimate the mean income of Black households, and underestimate the
variance within each group.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no data on beliefs about income distributions.
One piece of suggestive evidence comes from the standard finding in social psychology that
subjects estimate poor Blacks to outnumber poor Whites (Gilens, 1996). This is consistent
with the truncation – or at least, the dramatic underestimation – of the poor White household
type. In fact, because the White population in the US is over five times larger than the Black
population, poor White households outnumber poor Black households by 2 to 1. We return
to this issue of base-rate neglect below.
Another piece of suggestive evidence comes from the General Social Survey (GSS). Re-
spondents were asked what wealth level best characterises White and Black US households.
In the subjective scale proposed by GSS, a score of 1 (respectively, 7) reflects a belief that
almost everyone in the relevant group is rich (resp. poor). GSS respondents gave dramati-
cally different answers for the different groups: two thirds of respondents believe that most
Blacks are relatively poor (scores of 5 through 7), while 45% believe that most Whites are
relatively well off (scores 1 through 3) and only 9% believe that most Whites are relatively
poor.16 In reality, most blacks and most whites are in the middle class.
Stereotyping may shed light on several other phenomena. When assessing the perfor-
mance of firms in a hot sector of the economy, the investor recalls highly successful (and
16 See www3.norc.org/GSS+Website/Data+Analysis/.Data, questions WLTHBLKS and WLTHWHTS.
Question wording: “Now I have some questions about different groups in our society. I’m going to show
you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people in a group can be rated. A score of 1 means
that you think almost all of the people in that group are ’rich.’ A score of 7 means that you think almost
everyone in the group are ’poor.’ A score of 4 means you think that the group is not towards one end or
another, and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people
in that group stand. Where would you rate blacks [whites] in general on this scale?” Distribution of answers:
WLTHBLKS {.004, .01, .056, .26, .414, .207, .049}, WLTHWHTS {.051, .103, .293, .463, .071, .012, .007}.
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some moderately successful) firms in that sector. However, he neglects the possibility of fail-
ures, because failure is statistically non-diagnostic, and psychologically non-representative,
of a growing sector – even if it is likely. This causes both excessive optimism (in that
the expectation of growth is unreasonably high) and overconfidence (in that the variability
in earnings growth considered possible is truncated). True, the hot sector may have better
growth opportunities on average, but representativeness exaggerates this feature and induces
the investor to neglect a significant risk of failure.17 Similarly, when assessing an employee’s
skill level, an employer attributes high performance to high skill, because high performance
is the distinctive mark of a talented employee. Because he neglects the possibility that some
talented employees perform poorly and that some non-talented ones perform well (perhaps
due to stochasticity in the environment), the employer has too much faith in skill, and
neglects the role of luck in accounting for the output.
Proposition 2 implies that the DM overreacts to information that assigns people to groups,
since such information generates extreme stereotypes.18 We now show how this logic provides
a novel psychological account of some instances of base-rate neglect (Kahneman and Tversky,
1973). Consider the classic example in which a medical test for a particular disease with a
5% prevalence has a 90% rate of true positives and a 5% rate of false positives. The test
assigns each person to one of two groups, + (positive test) or − (negative test). The DM
estimates the frequency of the sick type (s) and the healthy type (h) in each group. The test
is informative: a positive result increases the relative likelihood of sickness, and a negative
result increases the relative likelihood of health for any prior. Formally:
Pr(+|s)
Pr(+|h) > 1 >
Pr(−|s)
Pr(−|h) . (3)
This condition has clear implications: the representative person who tests positive is sick,
while the representative person who tests negative is healthy. Following Proposition 2, the
17By emphasizing stereotypical outcomes in the valuation of firms’ stock, this logic provides a new mecha-
nism for the growth-value puzzle in asset pricing (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 1994). Because stereotyp-
ical outcomes are also extreme, this mechanism is very similar to that described using the model of salience
(Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer 2013b). In general, stereotypes and salience produce different results.
18In Section 3 we explore in detail how stereotypical beliefs react to a different kind of information, namely
information about the distribution of types when groups are given.
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DM reacts to the test by moving his priors too far in the right direction, generating extreme
stereotypes. He greatly boosts his assessment that a positively tested person is sick, but
also that a negatively tested person is healthy. Because most people are healthy, the DMs
assessment about the group that tested negative is fairly accurate but is severely biased for
the group that tested positive.
Our account of base-rate neglect is starkly different from a mechanical underweighting
of base-rates in Bayes rule. In the context of the medical test example, such underweighting
is modelled by postulating the modified Bayes rule (Grether 1980, Bodoh-Creed, Benjamin
and Rabin 2013):
Pr(h |G) = Pr(G |h) · Pr(h)
η
Pr(G |h) · Pr(h)η + Pr(G |s) · Pr(s)η (4)
where G = +,− denotes the result of the test and parameter η ∈ [0, 1] modulates the
strength of base-rate neglect. When η = 1, the DM follows Bayes’ rule. When η < 1,
the DM dampens the base-rates of h and of s. Equation (4) implies that, upon receiving
information, the DM can update his beliefs in the wrong direction: he can be less confident
that a person is healthy after a negative test than without any information, which cannot
happen in our model.19,20
3 Stereotypes and Reaction to New Information
Our model can be naturally extended to investigate how stereotypes and beliefs change
by the arrival of new information over time. To explore these dynamics, we suppose that
19Updating in the wrong direction occurs when the probability of being healthy is sufficiently high, so that
neglecting it reduces the posterior assessment of health for either test outcome.
20The mechanical underweigthing of base-rates in (4) accounts for other instances of base-rate neglect not
covered by our model, in particular those that arise in inference problems. This includes Kahneman and
Tversky ’s (1972) lawyers-engineers example as well as Griffin and Tversky’s (1992) biased coin example.
Griffin and Tversky (1992) present evidence consistent with pure neglect of base rates: subjects are told that
a coin is either 70% biased in favor of heads or 70% biased in favor of tails, and that the prior is 90% on
heads-biased. Given that the observed sample is 6 heads out of 10, the correct Bayesian posterior is 95%, but
subjects’ beliefs fell from the prior of 90% to a posterior of 70%. Such experiments are hard to compare with
the predictions of our model, because subjects are asked to generate the distribution of coin flips in their
minds (and not to recall types), which is a computationally difficult task to do. Their assessments, then,
might be wrong for a host of other reasons. See Bodoh-Creed, Benjamin and Rabin (2013) for a detailed
discussion.
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at the outset, unlike in Section 2, the decision maker does not have perfect information
about the categorical distribution (pit,G)t=1,...,N of the group G of interest, or about the
distribution (pit,−G)t=1,...,N of the comparison group −G. Instead, the DM has priors over
these distributions that are described by the Dirichlet distribution:
g [pit,W , αt,W ]t=t1,...,tN =
Γ (
∑
t αt,W )
ΠtΓ(αt,W )
· Πtpiαt,W−1t,W , for W = G,−G,
which are conveniently conjugate to the categorical distributions assumed so far. Parameters
αG = (αt,G)t=t1,...,tN and α−G = (αt,−G)t=t1,...,tN pin down the prior expectations of a Bayesian
agent:
Pr(T = t|αW ) = E(pit,W |αW ) = αt,W∑
u αu,W
, for W = G,−G. (5)
In contrast to the Bayesian agent, the stereotype initially held by the DM depends on
the probabilities in Equation (5) according to Definition 1. For simplicity, we set
∑
t αt,G =∑
t αt,−G.
Suppose that a sample nW = (n1,W , . . . , nN,W ) is observed, where nt,W denotes the ob-
servation count in type t and let
∑
t nt,W be the total number of observations for group W .
Then, the posterior probability of observing t assessed by a Bayesian agent is
Pr(T = t|αW , nW ) = E(pit,W |αW , nW ) = αt,W + nt,W∑
u(αu,W + nu,W )
, (6)
which is a weighted average of the prior probability of Equation (5) and the sample proportion
nt,W/nW of type t. As new observations arrive, the probability distribution in group W , and
thus stereotypes, are updated according to Equation (6).21
Consider how a DM influenced by representativeness updates beliefs. Given Equations
(5) and (6), Proposition 3 considers how new information changes the set of types that come
to mind, shedding light on when and how stereotypes change. Proposition 4 in turn considers
the effect of information on probability assessments for a given set of types included in the
21While we assume for simplicity that updating is Bayesian, the representativeness mechanism that links
priors to stereotypes can naturally be coupled with a non-Bayesian updating process. Psychologists have
documented a tendency to search for information that confirms one’s beliefs (Lord, Ross and Lepper 1979,
Nickerson 1998). Schwartzstein (2014) proposes a model of biased learning in which information is used to
update beliefs only about dimensions that are attended to.
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stereotype.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the DM observes the same number of realizations from both
groups, formally
∑
u nu,G =
∑
u nu,−G = n. Then:
i) If for both groups all observations occur on the same type t that is initially non-
representative for G, then this type does not become representative for G. Formally, if
nt,G = nt,−G = n for a type t such that αt,G/αt,−G < 1, then Pr(X = x|αW , nG)/Pr(X =
x|αW , n−G) < 1 for all n.
ii) If all observations for G occur in a non representative type for G, while those for
−G occur in a type that is representative for G, then for a sufficiently large number of
observations the stereotype for G changes. Formally, if nt,G = n for a type t such that
αt,G/αt,−G < 1, while nt′,−G = n for a type t′ such that αt′,G/αt′,−G > 1, then for n sufficiently
large Pr(T = t′|αW , nG)/Pr(T = t′|αW , n−G) < 1 < Pr(T = t|αW , nG)/Pr(T = t|αW , n−G) .
The stereotype for a group does not necessarily change if the new observations are con-
trary to the initial stereotype. For the stereotype of group G to change, the contrary ob-
servations must render previously neglected types sufficiently more likely in G, and thus
representative, than in the comparison group −G.
To see this, consider first case i), in which the data disconfirming G’s initial stereotype
uniformly accrue in the two groups G and −G. In this case, the non-representative type
never becomes representative for G despite the fact that the data consistently point to its
relevance. Reductions in the overall incidence of crime do not debunk a negative stereotype
about a group if a majority of criminals still come from that same group. A process of
economic development that improves the livelihoods of all groups in a population does not
improve the stereotype of a group that continues to include a disproportionally high share of
underdogs. The intuition for this result comes from diminishing sensitivity of the likelihood
ratio (Remark 1): types that are highly likely to occur in both groups are ceteris paribus
less representative.
Although stereotypes do not change when new information is symmetric across groups,
they can change quickly when information is asymmetric. In case ii), the n observations for
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G occur in a non-representative type t for G, while the n observations for −G occur in a
representative type t′ for G. In this case, for n sufficiently large, t becomes representative
for G while t′ becomes unrepresentative for G. One intuitive instance of this process is
the asymmetric reduction in the incidence of tail (but highly representative) events in a
group. Reducing crime in certain high-incidence neighborhoods, but not overall, decreases
the association between the population of those neighborhoods and crime, debunking the
group’s crime-based stereotype. The rapid rise of a new commercial class out of an underdog
group creates a new stereotype for that group. Some periods of above market performance
turns an uninteresting company into a growth stock. The arrival of new information, while
beneficial for a rational agent, may render stereotypes less accurate: in the case of the listed
company, its recent above average performance may be due to noise. But the investor leaves
little room for noise. He looks for causal patterns and quickly jumps to conclusions, even
if the informativeness of stereotype-changing information is low. After all, he thinks, above
average performance is the distinctive mark of great companies.
We now consider how the initial stereotype for group G (formally, the priors over G and
−G) affects the way in which the DM processes new information about G. We only consider
information concerning G: since the set of types included in the stereotype is assumed to be
constant, information about −G is irrelevant.
Proposition 4 Let d > 1. Suppose that one observation about type t is received in group G
(formally, n = nt,G = 1). Then:
i) If t belongs to the stereotype of G and its probability is sufficiently low, the DM over-
reacts (relative to the Bayesian) in revising upward his assessment of t’s probability. For-
mally, there is a threshold ν ∈ (0, 1/2) such that the DM’s assessment of t over-reacts if and
only if αt,G/
∑
u au,G < ν.
ii) If t does not belong to the stereotype of G, the DM does not update its probability at
all, so he under-reacts relative to the Bayesian DM.
Proposition 4 indicates that stereotypes can both over and under-react to information.
In case i), the DM strongly over-reacts to information confirming the stereotype. Intuitively,
because the DM neglects non-representative types, he does not fully account the current
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observation may be due to sampling variability. As a consequence, his beliefs overreact when
a type he does attend to is confirmed by the data. If criminal activity is part of a group’s
stereotype, the DM over-reacts to seeing a criminal from that group and his judgments
become even more biased against the group. If a growth company generates surprisingly
positive earnings, investors further upgrade their belief that the stock is a good investment,
because they neglect the possibility that an extreme observation may be due to noise.
At the same time, case ii) shows that the DM under-reacts (relative to a Bayesian) to
information inconsistent with the stereotype. This is because insofar as the stereotype is
unaffected, the probability of a non-stereotypical type is not upgraded, as the type remains
neglected in the assessment of the group. Upon observing a highly successful member of a
group stereotyped as the underdog, DMs code the occurrence as an “anomaly” and continue to
believe that the group at large should be viewed through the lens of the negative stereotype.
People can espouse racist views and yet be friendly with individual members of the group
they disregard. However, as shown in Proposition 4, non-stereotypical information is often
ineffective at changing beliefs even if it swamps the few instances underlying the stereotype.
Putting the two cases together, Proposition 4 implies that the DM exhibits a type of
confirmation bias (Lord, Ross and Lepper 1979, Nickerson, 1998). Faced with two observa-
tions of different types from group G (formally, nt,G = nt′,G = 1 and n = 2), such that t
belongs to the stereotype of G but t′ does not, the DM over-reacts to information consistent
with the stereotype and ignores information inconsistent with it. In this way, our approach
provides a unified mechanism that gives rise to both base-rate neglect and confirmation bias:
base-rate neglect arises when representative types are unlikely, while confirmation bias arises
when new information does not change representativeness and allows stereotypes to persist.
In the context of representativeness-based predictions, these biases are two sides of the same
coin.
4 Continuous Distributions
Many distributions of interest in economics can usefully be approximated by continuous prob-
ability distributions. Here we extend our model of stereotypes cover the case of continuous
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distributions. We then use this extension in our application in Section 5.
4.1 Basic Setting
Let T be a continuous variable defined on the support T ⊆ Rk. Denote by t ∈ T a realization
of T which is distributed according to a density function f(t) : T → R+. Denote by f(t|G)
and f(t| −G), the distributions of t in G and −G, respectively. In line with Definition 1, we
define representativeness as:
Definition 3 The representativeness of t ∈ T for group G is measured by the ratio of the
probability of G and −G at T = t, where −G = Ω\G. Using Bayes’ rule, this implies that
representativeness increases in the likelihood ratio f(t|G)/f(t| −G).
In the continuous case, the exemplar for G is the realization t that is most informative
about G. For one dimensional variables, the exemplar for G is sup(T ) if the likelihood ratio
is monotone increasing, or inf(T ) if the likelihood ratio is monotone decreasing, just as in
Proposition 2.
The DM constructs the stereotype by recalling the most representative values of t until
the recalled probability mass is equal to the bounded memory parameter δ ∈ [0, 1]. When
δ = 0, the DM only recalls the most representative type. When δ = 1 the DM recalls
the entire support T and his beliefs are correct. When δ is between 0 and 1, we are in an
intermediate case.
Definition 4 Given a group G and a threshold c ∈ R, define the set TG(c) =
{
t ∈ T | f(t|G)
f(t|−G) ≥ c
}
.
The DM forms his beliefs using a truncated distribution in TG(c(δ)) where c(δ) solves:∫
t∈T (c(δ))
f(t|G)dt = δ.
The logic is similar to that of Definition 2, with the only difference that now the memory
constraint acts on the recalled probability mass and not on the measure of states, which
would be problematic to compute when distributions have unbounded support. This feature
yields and additional (and potentially testable) prediction that changes in the distribution
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typically change also the support of the stereotype by triggering the DM to recall or forget
some states, even when the states’ relative representativeness does not change.
4.2 The Normal Case
When f(t|G) and f(t|−G) are univariate normal, the stereotype of G is easy to characterize.
Proposition 5 In the normal case, the stereotype works as follows:
i) Suppose σG = σ−G = σ. Then, if µG > µ−G the stereotype for G is TG = [tG,+∞),
where tG decreases with δ. Moreover, Est(t|G) > µG > µ−G > Est(t| −G).
If instead µG < µ−G, the stereotype for G is TG = (−∞, tG], where tG now increases with
δ. Moreover, Est(t|G) < µG < µ−G < Est(t|−G). In both cases, V arst(t|G) < V ar(t|G) and
V arst(t| −G) < V ar(t| −G).
ii) Suppose that σG < σ−G. Then, the stereotype for G is TG = [tG, tG] where tG decreases
and tG increases with δ. Moreover, V arst(t|G) < V ar(t|G).
iii) Suppose that σG > σ−G. Then, the stereotype for G is TG = (−∞, tG] ∪ [tG,+∞)
where tG increases and tS decreases with δ. Moreover, V arst(t|G) > V ar(t|G).
When the two distributions have the same variance, the stereotype is formed by trun-
cating from the original distribution the least representative tail (as in Section 2.3). In fact,
when the mean in G is above the mean in −G, the likelihood ratio is monotone increasing
and the exemplar for G is +∞; otherwise it is −∞. In both cases, the exemplar is inaccurate
because it relies on a highly representative but very low probability realization.
Figure 3 represents the distribution considered by the DM for the high mean group when
traits are normally distributed with the same variance across groups. In this example, the
true mean µG is included in the support, which in turn means that the value of δ is above
.5, e.g. δ = .7. Clearly, in this case the assessed mean is above µG and the assessed variance
is below the true variance σG. Both features are due to the fact that the distribution is
distorted towards the group exemplar at +∞. Because each distribution is represented by
its stereotypical tail, stereotypical thinking underestimates the variance of both distributions,
in line with the idea that stereotypes typically show little “within-group variation” (Hilton
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Figure 3: Stereotypes of a Normal distribution as a function of µ−G and σ−G.
and von Hippel 1996).22
Consider now case ii), where the variance of G is lower than that of −G. The stereotype
consists of an interval around an intermediate exemplar, denoted by tˆG. As in Proposition 1,
when the distribution in G is more concentrated than that in −G, the exemplar is accurate
and captures a relatively frequent, intermediate event. It is however somewhat distorted,
because tˆG lies below the group’s true mean µG if and only if µG < µ−G. Interestingly,
when the mean in the two groups is the same, the low variability group is represented by its
correct mean, namely µG. Again, because the distinctive feature of group G is being more
“average” than group −G, its stereotype neglects extreme elements and decreases within
group variation.
Finally, consider case iii). Now the variance in G is higher than that in −G. As a
consequence, both tails are exemplars and the stereotype includes both tails, truncating
away an intermediate section of the distribution. This representation increases perceived
volatility and thus captures the distinctive trait of G relative to −G, which is precisely
its higher variability. Stereotyping now induces the DM to recall group G’s most extreme
22The effects of stereotypical thinking on the perceived mean and variance of distributions described in
Proposition 5 hold more generally for all log-concave distributions, which includes the Normal as well as
many other common distributions; see Heckman and Honoré (1990).
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elements and to perceive G as more variable than it really is. This is a testable prediction of
our model that stands in contrast with the previous cases, and with the common description
that stereotypes reduce within-group variability (Hilton and Von Hippel 1996). However, it
is consistent with the more basic intuition that stereotyping highlights the most distinctive
features of group G, in this case its extreme elements. As an illustration of this mechanism,
when thinking about stock returns, investors may think of positive scenarios where returns
are high, or negative scenarios where returns are low, but neglect average returns, which are
more typical of safer asset classes.
Consider now dynamic updating in this normal case. The DM receives information about
the distributions f(t|G) and f(t| −G) over time. In each period k, a sample (tG,k, t−G,k) of
outcomes is observed, drawn from the two groups. The history of observations up to period
K is denoted by the vector tK = (tG,k, t−G,k)k=1,...,K .
Based on tK , and thus on the conditional distributions f(t|W, tK) for W = G,−G, the
DM updates stereotypes and beliefs. In one tractable case, the k = 0 initial distribution
f(t|W ) is also normal for W = G,−G. Formally, suppose that tW = θW + εW where εW is
i.i.d. normally distributed with mean 0 and variance v, and θW is the group specific mean.
Initially, groups are believed to be identical, in the sense that both θG and θ−G are normally
distributed with mean 0 and variance γ. After observing (tG,1, t−G,1), the distribution of
θW is updated according to Bayesian learning. Updating continues as progressively more
observations are learned. Thus, after observing the sample tK , we have:
f(t|W, tK) = N
(
γ ·K
v + γ ·K ·
∑
tW,k
K
; v · v + γ · (K + 1)
v + γ ·K
)
. (7)
The posterior mean for group W is an increasing function of the sample mean
∑
tW,k/K
for the same group. The variance of the posterior declines in sample size K, because the
building of progressively more observations reduces the variance of θW , in turn reducing the
variability of outcomes. However, and importantly, because the same number of observations
is received for each group, both groups have the same variance in all periods.
Consider now how learning affects stereotypes. Proposition 5 implies:
Proposition 6 At time K, the stereotype for group G is equal to [tG,+∞) if
∑
tG,k >
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∑
t−G,k and to (−∞, tG] if
∑
tG,k <
∑
t−G,k. As a result:
i) Gradual improvement of the performance of group G does not improve that group’s
exemplar (and only marginally affects its stereotype) provided
∑
tG,k stays below
∑
t−G,k. In
particular, common improvements in the performance of G and −G (which leave ∑ tG,k −∑
t−G,k constant) leave stereotypes unaffected.
ii) Small improvements in the relative performance of G that switch the sign of
∑
tG,k −∑
t−G,k have a drastic effect on stereotypes.
Even in the normal case, the process of stereotyping suffers from both under- and over-
reaction to information. If new information does not change the ranking between group
averages, exemplars do not change and stereotypes only respond marginally. Thus, even if
a group gradually increases its average, its stereotype may remain very low. On the other
hand, even small pieces of information can cause a strong over-reaction if they reverse the
ranking between group averages.
5 Group Identity, Gender Stereotypes, and Attitudes to-
wards Mathematics
Group identity plays a key role in sociologists’ thinking on group conflict, discrimination,
and cultural values. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) construct an economic model of identity,
based on the idea that individual preferences depend on one’s group membership.23 By
taking identity as given, this approach does not describe how group identity is formed and
evolves with the social context.
We propose a stereotype-based model of identity formation and change, in which social
context plays a central role. As in our basic model, decision makers form stereotypes by
contrasting the features of different social groups. This approach views self-identity as the
DM’s stereotype of his own group, consistent with the Oxford Dictionary definition of self-
identity as “the recognition of one’s potential and qualities as an individual, especially in
relation to social context.” In fact, according to Turner (1985), when group membership
23For a dynamic perspective on identity, including aspects of self-reputation, see Benabou and Tirole
(2011).
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is emphasised, “people come to see themselves more as the interchangeable exemplars of a
social category than as unique personalities defined by their differences from others”.
We develop a model of gender stereotypes along these lines to shed light on the gender
gap in attitudes towards education and mathematics. Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko (2006)
document that, since the 1930s, women in the US have lagged behind men in average school
grades, but started gaining ground in the 1970s, surpassing men in recent years. A simi-
lar pattern holds with respect to college enrollment and graduation, with women initially
lagging behind but recently overtaking men. Even in mathematics, a recent analysis of per-
formance at the high-school level in the US shows that women are performing essentially
as well as men (Hyde et al, 2008). Despite this improvement in overall school performance,
men are still over-represented at the highest performance levels in mathematics, in partic-
ular in standardised math tests. A much starker difference arises in the choices of college
degree, with women disproportionately choosing humanities and health related degrees and
careers (Weinberger 2005). This occurs even though there is a significant wage premium to
quantitative skills obtained with EMS (engineering, mathematics and science) degrees.24
In light of the small gender differences in mathematics test scores, explanations for this
gender gap have turned to the role of factors such as gender specific preferences for different
fields of study (Croson and Gneezy 2009) or risk aversion (see Bertrand 2011 for a review).
One important hypothesis holds that women are less competitive than men and thus more
reluctant to pursue the competitive technical fields. Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003),
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and others provide evidence in this direction. Recent work,
however, suggests that women’s preferences for math and math competitions depends on con-
text, and in particular on women’s confidence about their relative performance (Niederle and
Vesterlund 2008, Dreber, Essen and Ranehill 2012, Coffman 2014). Our model of stereotypes
parsimoniously accounts for these disparate pieces of evidence, and delivers new predictions
by offering a psychological foundation for the origins of gender identity.
24In 2001, women accounted for 57.4% of bachelor degrees in the US, including 85% of degrees in Health
professions, 60% in Biology and Life Sciences, 27% in Computer Science and 20% in Engineering (Livingstone
and Wirt, 2004). This occurs even though prospective college students are reasonably informed about this
wage premium (Betts, 1996).
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5.1 Confidence in Math Skills and Attitudes Toward Competition
We begin by considering gender identities formed with respect to performance on standard-
ised math tests, such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) or the National Assessment
of Educational Progress (NAEP).25 The score distributions obtained from either assessment
have an inverse-U shape for both men and women. The average math scores are only slightly
higher for men than for women (531 vs 499 out of 800 on the SAT, 308 vs 304 out of 500 on
the NAEP in 2013). For the SAT, the monotone likelihood ratio property holds over nearly
the entire range of scores, with men having a heavier right tail than women. Men are twice
as likely to have a perfect SAT math score than women.26
Several factors might contribute to the observed gender gaps in math and other disci-
plines: differences in individual effort, innate ability, or investment by third parties (parents
or teachers).27 We first consider a model in which stereotypes reflect stable differences in
observable math skills, as proxied by performance in math tests, to investigate how self
identity is formed. In section 5.2, we consider math skills as a product of innate ability and
effort, and explore how effort choices and self identity are jointly endogenously determined.
Consider a population that varies in mathematical skill z, as proxied by test scores.
There are two groups, M and F (male and female). Skill z is normally distributed in group
G = F,M with mean zG and variance σ2. To capture the evidence on test scores, we let M
have a slightly higher average skill than F , zM > zF . Given that the two groups have the
same variance, MLRP holds and M has a heavier right tail than F .
We make the extreme assumption, which we later relax, that individuals are uninformed
about their own skill, but observe the full skill distributions of both groups (e.g. through
25SAT is a standardised college admission test, so the population taking it is not rep-
resentative of the full population. Also, more women take the test (53%) which may
bias women’s results downwards relative to men’s. The NAEP conducts yearly assessment
of a representative sample’s proficiency in several domains, including mathematics and read-
ing. For SAT scores see http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/research/SAT-Percentile-
Ranks-By-Gender-Ethnicity-2013.pdf. For NAEP scores for 17 year olds in mathematics, see
http://nationsreportcard.gov/ltt_2012/age17m.aspx. See Hyde et al (2008), Fryer and Levitt (2009), and
Pope and Sydnor (2010) for in-depth empirical analyses of the gender gap in mathematics.
26About 1% of men, and 0.45% of women, taking the SAT obtain the perfect score of 800, see
http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/research/SAT-Mathemathics-Percentile-Ranks-2012.pdf
27The following analysis is in all ways similar to that of gender gap in other disciplines. We focus on
mathematics because it is an important driver of subsequent career choices and outcomes, and as a result
has been the object of intense attention in the literature.
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grades). Because these distributions satisfy MLRP, the stereotype of the slightly better group
M lies in the right tail while that of the slightly worse group F lies in the left tail (Propo-
sition 5). Formally, there exist two thresholds zM(δ) and zF (δ) such that the stereotypical
assessments of groups M and F are:
zstM = E [z|z ≥ zM(δ),M ] , zstF = E [z|z ≤ zF (δ), F ]
It follows that, for δ < 1, stereotypes exaggerate differences in the assessments of skill.
Lemma 1 When comparing genders along the dimension of math skill, the gender stereo-
types satisfy (assuming δ < 1):
zstM > zM > zF > z
st
F . (8)
Comparing the performance of the two groups leads to self-stereotyping. Women under-
estimate their skill in math, stereotyping themselves as being worse than they really are,
zstF < zF . Women stereotype men as disproportionately coming from the right tail, and thus
overestimate men’s skills, zstM > zM . Similarly, men overestimate their skill in math, and see
women as less able. Perceived group differences in skill are large even if true differences are
in fact tiny because stereotypes exaggerate the differences among groups.
Proposition 1 has a number of implications that help clarify the literature.
Prediction 1 Women are less likely to participate in math tasks than men because they
underestimate their own math skill, even in non-competitive settings.
Suppose that participation in a math task entails a cost c, for instance exerting effort
in solving a math test or in studying for an engineering college degree. The benefit of
participation is equal to math skill z, and the payoff from non participation is zero. Then,
in a mixed-gender environment, a member of group G chooses to participate if and only if:
zstG > c. (9)
In a mixed-gender environment men are disproportionally more likely to engage in math
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related activities than women. This is consistent with the evidence that, controlling for math
grades, women are much less likely to choose engineering, mathematics and science majors
in college (Weinberger 2005, Bertrand 2011).
This logic is consistent with the so called “stereotype threat” effect, whereby an individ-
ual’s performance in a task deteriorates when (s)he is reminded of belonging to a negatively
stereotyped group. In our model, bringing a person’s group membership to mind invites
a cross-group comparison that triggers the self-stereotype, even in non-competitive tasks.
Coffman (2014) provides compelling evidence that, in team decision making – a cooperative
rather than competitive setting – women are under-confident, and men are over-confident
(conditional on measured skill), in answering trivia questions in stereotypical male domains
such as Geography and Sports.
The literature offers a range of evidence consistent with the importance of confidence to
explain participation in mixed-gender math tasks: controlling for performance, women are
less confident than men about their ability in math (Eccles 1998, Niederle and Vesterlund
2007, Buser, Niederle and Oosterbeek 2014), and this difference helps account for educational
choices (Buser, Niederle and Oosterbeek 2014) and other outcomes (Stein, 2013). Similarly
men participate in mathematics tasks because they are overconfident about their abilities,
and so are willing to bear the cost of participation.28
Starting with Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003), a large literature shows that the
gender gap is even stronger in tournament-like structures in which rewards go the the top
performer in a math task. Women are indeed less willing to compete than men in mixed
math contests, and the conventional explanation is that women have an intrinsic distaste for
competition. While we do not deny the potentially important role of such gender-specific
preferences, our model can explain why women are less willing than men to engage in mixed
math contests and also makes the following addditional predictions.
Prediction 2 Women’s willingness to compete is shaped by their self-stereotype in the com-
28Some studies also document that both women and men are overconfident with respect to their actual
location in the distribution of task scores (but men are more overconfident than women). A literature in
Social Psychology documents that individuals are overconfident in tasks where their absolute performance
is good (e.g. driving), and under confident in tasks where their absolute performance is poor (e.g. juggling),
see Moore and Cain (2007). We do not address this issue because it requires an analysis of how individual
members of a group stereotype themselves relative to other members of the same group.
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petitive environment. In particular:
i) Women are unwilling to compete in mixed-gender math tournaments.
ii) Women are willing to compete in single-gender math tournaments.
iii) Women are willing to compete against men in areas that are stereotypically neutral
or stereotypically female.
Once again, suppose that to participate in a math tournament a DM must bear a cost c.
The participant with the highest skill receives a prize larger than c, the other receives zero.
If participants have the same skill, each gets the prize with probability 1/2.
Case i) captures the stylised fact (Gneezy et al 2003, Niederle and Versterlund 2007)
that, controlling for performance, women are less likely to choose a tournament-based com-
pensation scheme than a piece-rate scheme in a mixed-gender math contest. According to
(8), when competing against men, women underestimate their own skill, and overestimate
their opponent’s skill. Thus, they attach a lower probability to winning and are less likely to
participate in the tournament than they would be under rational beliefs.29 Consistent with
our model, the evidence shows that after controlling for confidence the gender gap in tour-
nament entry diminishes significantly (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007) or vanishes altogether
(Dreber, Essen and Ranehill 2012).30 Similarly, Buser, Niederle and Oosterbeek’s (2014)
evidence on the choice of education path in Dutch high schools suggests that the gender gap
is significantly, though not entirely, reduced once confidence is taken into account.
Consider now case ii). When competing against other women, women perceive their
skill distribution correctly and thus attach probability 0.5 to winning. Women now are as
likely to enter a single-sex competition as men. This prediction is confirmed by a range
of experimental and field evidence. Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) document that
29Formally, if stereotypes are sufficiently severe (δ is low enough) so that zM (δ) > zF (δ), women attach
zero probability to the outcome of outperforming a male competitor. In the less extreme case where zM (δ) <
zF (δ), women attach some probability to competing with a man who is less able than them. It is still the
case, though, that women are reluctant to compete against men, given that they stereotype the latter as
disproportionally coming from the right tail.
30Measuring confidence as estimated rank in past tasks, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) suggest that gender
differences in confidence account for only 27% of gender differences in tournament entry. This suggests a
smaller role of confidence than do Dreber et al (2012) and Buser et al (2014). One possible reason is that
estimation of future performance may be systematically different from estimation of past relative performance
or of overall skill, particularly if – due to stereotypical thinking – past positive performance is perceived as
simply due to luck. Broader measures of confidence include subjective beliefs about own skill in math (as in
Buser et al 2014), and estimates of future performance.
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women are as likely as men to enter single-gender math tournaments. Niederle and Vester-
lund (2008) show that introducing quota-like (affirmative action) schemes into tournaments
boosts female participation. Like Niederle and Vesterlund, we interpret quotas as making
the tournament more like a single-sex competition. In explaining the evidence, however, we
do not assume that female distaste of competition falls in less mixed environments; instead,
we see the quotas as changing the self-stereotype of participants by changing the group they
compare themselves to. Specifically, in our model quotas exert two effects. First, they reduce
the probability that a woman attaches to competing against right-tail men, encouraging par-
ticipation. Second, by moving the setting towards a single-sex tournament, quotas relieve
the stereotype threat for women, improving their confidence. Gneezy et al (2003) find that
women’s performance on single sex tournaments is significantly better than when competing
against men. Their analysis shows this results from higher effort in single-sex tournaments
(particularly from women of average skill), in agreement with our prediction on the impact
of tournament structure on beliefs about skill.31 Finally, Booth and Nolen (2009) offer sug-
gestive evidence that women educated in single-sex schools are as competitive as men, even
in mathematics.
Consider now case iii). A stereotypically neutral activity is characterized by zM = zF ,
while a stereotypically female activity has zM < zF . Women now (weakly) over-estimate
their skill relative to men’s, and by reversing the previous argument, are (weakly) more
likely to participate in the tournament. A recent but growing body of experimental evidence
shows that, in verbal tasks, women are as likely to compete as men (Günther, Ekinci and
Schwieren 2010, Grosse and Riener 2010, Kamas and Preston 2012a,b, Dreber, Essen and
Ranehill 2012). Shurchkov (2012) shows that women outperform male competitors in verbal
tasks, particularly under reduced time pressure. Verbal tasks are seen as weakly stereotypi-
cally female,32 so the evidence that women are as competitive as, but not necessarily more
31Evidence from Gneezy et al (2003) also suggests that men increase effort slightly (though not signifi-
cantly) when competing against women, as compared to single sex tournaments.
32The stereotype that women are better than men at verbal tasks is generally perceived to be weaker
than the stereotype that men are better at math. Kimura (1999) suggests that women are better at verbal
association, but not in verbal fluency. This view is consistent with SAT scores: men are 30 points ahead in
math, 5 points ahead in reading and 10 points behind in writing (out of a total of 800 points). Moreover, the
monotone likelihood ratio property holds for math scores, with the likelihood ratio (men/women) ranging
from 3 at the highest scores down to 0.5 at the lowest observed scores. In comparison, in the writing and
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competitive than, men is in line with our prediction. Coffman (2014) shows that women are
both better and more overconfident than men in knowledge of Art History and Pop Culture,
but the reverse holds for questions about Geography and Sports. In agreement with our
model, Art History and Pop Culture are perceived by the subjects as being stereotypical
female domains, while Geography and Sports are perceived as stereotypical male domains.
Turning to field evidence, Flory, Leibbrandt and List (2010) show in a natural field exper-
iment that both men and women are less likely to apply for jobs in which the compensation
scheme depends on relative performance, but while there is a large gender gap when the job
has male connotations (sports news assistant), this gap disappears when these connotations
are absent (news assistant). Smith (2013) shows that girls’ performance is as resistant to
competitive pressure as boys’ in the National Spelling Bee competition.
So far we have considered the extreme scenario in which individuals are completely un-
informed about their own performance and form stereotypes and inferences based on the
population distribution of skill z. Our results extend to the case where individuals observe
their own performance (e.g., from test scores) and use that information in forming their
self-stereotype. For simplicity we assume that, after observing performance t, the expected
skill of a member of group G is (1 − α)zG + αt, where α increases in the signal to noise
ratio.33 Thus, even a woman whose performance is above the male average, t > zM , may be
stereotyped as not good at math provided t < zF + 1−αα (zM − zF ). The reason is that, even
if her average performance is good, high level performance from a member of group F is
perceived as a fluke while representative performances come from the left tail. By the same
token, even men whose performance lies below the average female performance, t < zF , can
be stereotyped as good at math provided t > zM − 1−αα (zM − zF ). This logic delivers an
interesting prediction:
Prediction 4 The gender gap in attitudes towards mathematics is stronger for individuals
of “average” skill, whose performance is located close to the population mean.
reading sections of distribution of SAT scores are much more similar across genders. However, other results
suggest that at a younger age women are far better than men at reading (Pope and Sydnor 2010, Guiso,
Monte, Sapienza and Zingales 2008).
33The underlying assumption is that own performance t does not affect the group stereotype encoded
in zstG . This simplifies the analysis, but similar results obtain when individual performance shapes the
representativeness of skill realisations for that individual.
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To see this, note that when individual performance is extreme, it dominates the individ-
ual’s choices: even though on average women’s self-assessment is below that of men, very
talented individuals of either gender are likely to participate in math tournaments, and left
tail individuals of either gender are not. However, because average women have significantly
worse self-stereotypes than average men, this greatly affects their choices to participate.
This finding is consistent with both experimental and field evidence. Niederle and Vesterlun
(2007) find that too few high skill women, and too many low skill men, enter the competi-
tive tournament. Buser, Niederle and Oosterbeek (2014) document that the gender gap in
curriculum choice shows up precisely at the mean: while average men choose highly mathe-
matical curricula, average women choose very humanities-intensive curricula, so that women
are over-represented in the latter while men are over-represented in the former.
Our predictions are consistent with the literature on the gender gap in performance in
mathematics, but also with the broader literature on identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2000,
Bénabou and Tirole 2011), self-categorisation (Turner 1985, Benjamin, Choi, Strickland
2010) and stereotype threat (Steele and Aaaronson 1995).34 Our account provides a new
mechanism that helps link these different concepts. The social context defines the group
individuals compare themselves to and thus shapes their self-stereotypes. Applied to per-
formance in mathematics, competition between genders primes each gender to evoke its
(self-)stereotypes. The resulting perception of own skill distorts incentives to participate
and provide effort.
5.2 Gender Stereotypes in Equilibrium
In our model so far, stereotypes are formed on the true distribution of math skill z, as proxied
by performance in tests. Performance in math tests, however, reflects in part innate ability
and in part learning effort by individuals.35 Effort and ability are difficult to measure directly,
but we show that - by shaping effort - stereotypes about ability emerge in equilibrium even
34According to Turner (1985), feelings of identity need not be permanent but can be primed by social
interactions. Related, the literature on stereotype threat holds that when group membership is associated
with a negative (positive) stereotype, emphasising it provokes feelings of anxiety (or elation) that affect
performance in a way that confirms the stereotype.
35There is also a well established role of investment by third-parties, such and families and teachers (Carrell,
Page and West 2009). Here we focus on the role of self-stereotypes and decisions about individual effort.
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with no underlying ability differences between groups.
Suppose that skill z is given by:
z = e+ θG + ε. (10)
Here e is individual-level effort, θG is the average innate ability in group G, and ε captures
the individual effect in innate talent or in the productivity of effort (due, for instance, to
non-cognitive skills). The realization of ε is not yet known when the individual chooses his
or her effort level e. We assume that ε is distributed normally, with mean 0 and variance σ2.
The effort choice is determined by long run economic returns from math skills. There is
a convex effort cost c(e) and a “mincerian return” pi to skills in the market. The expected
market wage is E[w(z)] = E [epiz] = epiE[z]+pi2σ2/2.
A fully rational and risk neutral individual chooses effort e to maximize E[w(z)] − c(e),
which yields:
c′(e) = piepi(e+θG)+pi
2σ2/2. (11)
This equation identifies an increasing function e∗(·) such that an individual who perceives
his average ability to be θG exerts the effort level e∗(θG).36 Individuals and thus groups with
higher innate ability invest more and their observed higher math skills are due to both higher
ability and higher effort.
We now turn to stereotypes. As in the rational case, the decision maker trades off the
cost of effort c(e) against the return associated with the skill distribution z(e). However, by
comparing the observed skill z in the two groups, the DM develops stereotypes about each
group’s innate abilities. This boils down to individuals forming a stereotype for realisations
ε of each group. To see this, suppose for simplicity that every individual in group G = M,F
chooses the same effort eG. As a consequence, skill in group G = M,F is normally distributed
with mean E[z|G] = eG + θG and variance σ2. The logic of Section 5.1, then implies the
following property.
Lemma 2 When eG + θG > e−G + θ−G, the self-stereotype of G truncates the left tail of z,
so that Est[ε|G] > 0. When eG + θG < e−G + θ−G, the self stereotype of −G truncates the
36We assume that the cost function c(·) is sufficiently concave that the f.o.c. identifies a maximum.
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right tail of z, so that Est[ε|G] < 0. When eG + θG = e−G + θ−G, assessments are correct and
Est[ε|G] = 0.
When men exhibit higher average skill (10) than women, eM + θM > eF + θF , the
stereotype for a man is to have right tail ability, while that for a woman is to have left
tail ability.37 Formally, Est(ε |M) > 0 > Est(ε |F ). Intuitively, men are disproportionally
common in the right tails of the test scores distribution, which evokes images of men with
high innate ability and leads women to stereotype themselves as a low innate ability group.
When men have lower average skill – namely eM + θM < eF + θF – the reverse is true,
in that Est(ε |M) < 0 < Est(ε |F ). When men and women have the same average skill, all
performance levels are equally representative for both groups and assessments are on average
correct, in that Est(ε |M) = Est(ε |F ) = 0.
Critically, math skills depend not just on innate ability but also on effort. As in models
of statistical discrimination, the fact that stereotypes depend on endogenous effort choices
can create self fulfilling stereotypes: a positive stereotype begets higher effort which in turn
confirms the stereotype itself.38 Indeed, a member of group G chooses an optimal effort level
equal to e∗(θstG), where θstG = θG + Est(ε |G). An equilibrium thus consists of effort levels
(e∗F , e
∗
M) and stereotypes (θstF , θstM) such that: i) effort levels are optimal given stereotypes,
namely e∗F = e∗(θstF ) and e∗M = e∗(θstM), and ii) stereotypes are endogenously confirmed,
namely e∗M + θM > e∗F + θF if and only if θstM > θstF .
In the special case in which the two groups have exactly the same average innate ability,
the equilibria are as follows.
37We implicitly assume that individuals form stereotypes about their ability based on the performance of
their group as a whole, neglecting the individual effort differences. An alternative specification, in which
effort differences are not neglected, is as follows: when choosing an effort level e, an individual of group G
forms his self-stereotype by comparing his skill distribution θG+ e+ ε to the equilibrium skill distribution of
group −G. This individual stereotypes himself as a right tail individual if and only if he provides sufficiently
high effort, θG + e > θ−G + e∗−G. In this model, stereotypes only arise when there are underlying group
differences in ability, but stereotyping exaggerates them. An individual of the lower ability group G might
consider providing enough effort to match −G’s skill level, but because the effort of −G is inflated (all
members of −G think they are right tail individuals) it is too costly to do so. Only extreme effort levels are
consistent with the stereotypes.
38The literature of statistical discrimination is also concerned with how beliefs can be self-fulfilling when
effort provision is endogenous. However, that literature is focused on the beliefs of others about the DM,
while here we emphasise stereotypical beliefs about the self. Below we expand on the links and differences
between stereotypes and statistical discrimination.
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Proposition 7 When θF = θM = θ, there are three possible equilibria:
i) Women have a negative stereotype, and e∗F < e∗(θ) < e∗M .
ii) Men have a negative stereotype, and e∗M < e∗(θ) < e∗F .
iii) Stereotypes are correct, and e∗M = e∗F = e∗(θ).
Consider case i). Because women believe they have lower ability, θstF < θstM , they also exert
less effort at math, e∗F < e∗M . As a consequence, women indeed perform worse than men at
math, confirming the negative female stereotype in equilibrium. A similar logic holds with
respect to the positive male stereotype. In case iii), individuals hold correct expectations on
their equal innate ability levels and exert the same effort, which are consistent with correct
stereotypes. Among these three possible equilibria, only those with incorrect stereotypes are
stable.39
Proposition 7 shows that stereotypes and the ability distributions influence each other
in the long run. Stereotypes can cause prior beliefs concerning the abilities of women and
men to become self reinforcing, even though these beliefs may not be based on direct expe-
rience. Prior belief that men have greater ability, θF < θM , render an equilibrium in which
women suffer a negative stereotype more likely. The negative stereotype, in turn, causes
even larger observed differences in skill through differential effort choices. This logic implies
that prior beliefs about groups’ abilities may lead, through effort choices, to outcomes that
are unfounded in the groups’ true underlying characteristics. A society can hold a negative
stereotype about women (and a positive stereotype about men) even if women have on aver-
age higher innate ability than men, as long as under those stereotypes men put in sufficient
effort to counterbalance women’s ability advantage.40
The model predicts that societies with greater beliefs of gender disparity exhibit greater
gender gap in performance in tasks that are strongly stereotypical of a particular gender.
This prediction is confirmed by several studies that link the gender gap in mathematics to
measures of gender (in)equality, both at the country level (Guiso et al 2008, Fryer and Levitt
39In fact, a small increase in effort provision by a group would displace accurate beliefs, leading to a
breakdown of equilibrium iii).
40Formally, (θstG − θst−G) · (θG − θ−G) < 0 holds if and only if the difference in true average abilities is
smaller than the difference in optimal effort provision under the stereotypical abilities. In particular, if
0 < θG − θ−G < e∗(θst−G)− e∗(θstG ) then θst−G > θstG .
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2010) and at a state level in the US (Pope and Sydnor 2010). Consistent with our model,
both Guiso et al (2008) and Pope and Sydnor (2010) also find that the negative gender gap
in women’ performance in mathematics is correlated with a positive gender gap in women’
performance in reading tasks, which are more typically associated with women.41
The result that endogenous effort might lead to self-fulfilling beliefs about skill also
obtains in models of statistical discrimination (Phelps 1972, Arrow 1973, Coate and Loury
1993). That approach focuses on the beliefs of others (including potential employers) about
one’s ability, which shape returns to effort. In contrast, our approach highlights the role of
self identity, which allows us to account even for phenomena in which beliefs held by others
play no role.42’43
The analysis of stereotype evolution in Section 3 may provide further insights into the
dynamics of the gender gap. Goldin et al (2006) document a large increase in schooling and
college attendance for both men and women in the US in the middle of the 20th century,
but a greater increase for men. Consistent with Proposition 3, greater access to education
for both groups did not lead to a change in the stereotype that higher education is a stereo-
typical male activity. More recently, however, there has been a disproportionate increase
in the educational achievement of women. According to Proposition 4, this can eventually
reverse the stereotype for educational attainment, so that attending college might become
41Equilibria of type ii) can arise in societies where cultural norms assign a larger role to women. Gneezy,
Leonard and List (2009) document the case of the Khasi, a matrilineal society in India, in which inheritance
and clan membership are transmitted through the female lineage. Among the Khasi, women choose to
compete in the authors’ experiment at twice the rate of men. This suggests a reversal of roles relative to the
previous case, such that women have a positive self-stereotype while men have a negative self-stereotype.
42To fully evaluate the role of stereotypes in education efforts and outcomes it is necessary to also consider
the stereotypes of prospective employers. In case i) of Proposition 7, both men and women have a negative
stereotype of women, so it is rational for an individual woman to cut effort (even if she has an accurate
perception of her ability). Moreover, employees who are hired through affirmative action may be stereotyped
as less competent, independently of their own ability, reinforcing the negative stereotypes of their group. On
the other hand, if there is an improvement of stereotypes, then the effect is a double-whammy. In the case
where women’s stereotypes become positive the assessment of women’s ability increases, causing women to
put in more effort and be compensated by higher recognition in the job market. This can lead to a new high
effort/high performance equilibrium for this group.
43Disentangling stereotypes from statistical discrimination in the market is beyond the scope of this paper.
We note, however, that our model makes the strong prediction that removing the effect of negative stereotypes
(e.g. by reducing the tournament-like structure of job allocation or using the single-sex tournament) which
is related to establishing quotas for women (Niederle and Vesterlund 2008) leads to an increase in effort
provision (though this may occur under some circumstances in models of statistical discrimination as well,
see Coate and Loury 1993).
40
a stereotypical female activity. In fact, Goldin et al (2006) suggest that the gender gap in
overall college education is outright reversed.
More generally, innovations that affect the genders asymmetrically can drive changes in
gender stereotypes. Examples of such innovations include social innovations (the feminist
movement), technological innovations (home appliances taking over previously stereotypical
female activities), and interactions between the two (the contraceptive pill allowing women
to better plan and balance work and family).
To conclude, we note that gaps in educational achievement exist not only across genders,
but across ethnic and socio-economic groups. Stereotypes might also be instrumental in un-
derstanding why, for instance, individuals from poor backgrounds underinvest in education.
We return to this point in the conclusion.
6 Likelihood, Availability, and Stereotypes
The assumption that stereotypes are formed based only on representativeness allows for a
tractable model of stereotype formation and change. The model yields clear predictions
that account for many characteristics of stereotypes described by psychologists (Hilton and
Von Hippel, 1996), including the fact that stereotypes emphasise group differences and often
minimise within group variation, as a consequence of the central (and previously unexplored)
insight that stereotypes are context dependent.
At the same time, as we discussed in Section 2.2, our formulation leads in some instances
to extreme predictions and, importantly, it neglects other factors that influence what features
come to mind when thinking about a group, such as likelihood and availability.44 When
stereotyping the occupation of a democratic voter, people think about “professor” rather
than a “comparative literature professor.” While the latter is probably more representative,
the former is more likely and thus it comes to mind more easily. When US survey respondents
think about Arabs in the aftermath of 9/11, terrorists rather than Bedouins are more likely
to come to mind because, even though the latter are more likely and more representative (all
44According to Kahneman and Frederick (2005) “the question of why thoughts become accessible – why
particular ideas come to mind at particular times – has a long history in psychology and encompasses notions
of stimulus salience, associative activation, selective attention, specific training, and priming”.
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Bedouins are Arabs, but not all terrorists are Arabs), the former are more available because
they are more frequently brought up in news sources (see footnote 8).
In this section we show that our model can be easily adapted to account for some effects
of likelihood on recall. When we do so, our predictions become less extreme, in the sense
that stereotypes become centered around relatively more likely or available types, but the
distortions of stereotypes still follow the logic of representativeness, as in our main analysis.
This extension can also capture the effects of a crude measure of availability on recall.
Suppose that the ease of recall of a type t for group G is given by:
Rk(t, G) =
pit,G
pit,−G + k
=
1
1
R(t,G)
+ k · 1
pit,G
(12)
where k ≥ 0 and R(t, G) is representativeness as defined in Definition 1. In Equation (12),
the ease of recalling type t increases when that type is more representative, namely when
R(t, G) is higher, but also when type t is more likely in group G, namely when pit,G is
higher. The value of k modulates the relative strength of these two effects: for small k,
representativeness drives ease of recall, while for large k likelihood drives recall.45
In this new formulation, the stereotype is formed as in Definition 2 except that now what
comes to mind are the d types that are easiest to recall. When representative types are
also likely, as in case iii) of Proposition 1, recall based on Equation (12) does not change
the stereotype for group G. When instead representativeness and likelihood differ for group
G, as in cases i) and ii) of Proposition 1, recall driven by Rk(t, G) may yield a different
stereotype than a pure representativeness model.
To see how the model can capture some features of availability, note than the term pit,G
in (12), and also in (1), may be broadly interpreted as capturing the availability, rather than
just the frequency, of type t for group G. Formally, in the model of learning of Section 3,
we would assume that the estimate of pit,G is determined by the share of observations from
G that are of type t, even if these observations are not independent. Thus, as the same
episodes of terrorism are mentioned repeatedly in the news, their ease of recall is inflated. In
45When k = 0, we are in a pure representativeness model. As k increases, likelihood becomes progressively
more important in shaping recall relative to representativeness. As k → ∞, only likelihood matters for
shaping recall and stereotypes.
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this approach, availability is related to neglect of the correlation structure of information (as
discussed in Section 2.2, understanding the psychology of availability is beyond the scope of
this paper).
The concrete implications of Equation (12) are best seen in the case where the type space
is continuous, and more specifically when t is normally distributed in groups G and −G, with
means µG, µ−G respectively, and variance σ. In this case, the easiest to recall type t for group
G is given by:
tE,G = argminte
(t−µG)2−(t−µG)2
2σ2 + k · e (
t−µG)2
2σ2
When µG > µ−G, the easiest to recall type tE,G satisfies:
k · (tE,G − µG) · e
(tE,G−µG)
2
+2(µG−µ−G)·
(
tE,G−
µG+µ−G
2
)
2σ2 = µG − µ−G (13)
The left hand side of (13) is increasing in tE,G, which implies that tE,G is a strictly
increasing function of k satisfying limk→∞ tE,G(k) = µG and limk→0 tE,G(k) = ∞. In words,
the group G with higher mean is stereotyped with an inflated assessment that goes in the
direction of the most representative type t = ∞. The extent of this inflation increases as
k gets smaller. The stereotype for group G in this case is an interval around the easiest to
recall type that captures a total probability mass of δ (truncating both tails, but especially
the left one). Moreover, as in the case k = 0, the stereotype has a lower variance than the
true distribution. A corresponding result is obtained if group G has a lower mean than −G.
This analysis implies that the basic insights that stereotypes emphasise differences, and
lead to base rate carry through to this case, as does the analysis of self-stereotypes.46 The
dynamic updating of stereotypes of Proposition 6 carries over to this formulation as well: as
long as the ranking of group means is maintained, group stereotypes (in the sense of which
group has a positive or negative stereotype) do not change.
46In the extended model given by (12) and (2), the parameters δ and k capture two natural types of bounds
on recall: δ determines “how much" comes to mind (which might depend on effort), while k corresponds to
the relative weight of likelihood in recall, which may vary across people.
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7 Conclusion
We presented a model of stereotypical thinking, in which decision makers making predictions
about a group recall only a limited range of the group’s types or attributes from memory.
Recall is limited but also selective: the recalled types are not the most likely ones given the
DM’s data, but rather the most representative ones, in the sense of being the most diagnostic
types about the group relative to other groups.
Our approach provides a parsimonious and psychologically founded account of how DMs
generate simplified representations of reality, from social groups to stock returns, and offers
a unified account of disparate pieces of evidence relating to this type of uncertainty. First,
the model captures the central fact that stereotypes highlight the greatest difference between
groups, thus explaining why some stereotypes are very accurate, while others lack any valid-
ity. In a dynamic setting, the model explains when DMs under- or over-react to information.
In particular, the model accounts for stereotype persistence and stereotype change.
This same logic allows us to describe a number of heuristics and psychological biases,
many of which arise in the context of prediction problems. Our model generates both base-
rate neglect and confirmation bias (and makes novel predictions for when they occur). To
our knowledge, ours is the first model to reconcile these two patterns of behavior, and in fact
shows they both arise out of the assumption of representativeness-based recall. The approach
can also unify several other biases, such as overconfidence but also – under appropriate
extensions not discussed in the paper – polarisation effects.47
In a different vein, we show how stereotypes provide fresh insight into the notion of iden-
tity, both in terms of distorted beliefs about one own’s abilities (self-identity) and about
others (discrimination). Applied to gender stereotypes, our model offers a parsimonious ac-
count of many findings in a vast literature covering the gender gap in educational attainment,
in competitive settings and in labor outcomes. Group membership generates self-stereotypes,
which distort incentives to invest in education and to participate in the job market. The same
mechanism can also account for a variety of stylised facts on educational attainment across
47Polarization arises as a consequence of confirmation bias when DMs have heterogeneous priors. Propo-
sition 3 then implies that a given set of observations can lead different DMs with different stereotypes to
each reinforce their own stereotype, and thus update in opposite directions.
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socio-economic groups, as described for instance in Banerjee and Duflo (2011). Stereotyping
a highly educated person as having a good government job, and a less educated person as
being unemployed, generates counter-factual beliefs that returns to education are convex.
This discourages students – particularly those who for a variety of reasons do not expect to
attain the maximum level of education – from investing even moderately in schooling.
Our model is centrally based on representativeness and it does not capture all the features
of stereotypical thinking. However, we argue that it captures perhaps the central feature,
namely that when we think of a group, we focus on what is most distinctive about it, and
neglect the rest. Many aspects of social preferences might thus be interpreted as stereotypical
beliefs: predictable, persistent and yet evolving with circumstances.
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A Proofs
Remark 1. We first establish that representativeness R(x, S) of a type t for group
S increases in the likelihood ratio Pr(X = x|S)/Pr(X = x| − S). From Definition 1,
R(x, S) = Pr(S|X = x)/Pr(−S|X = x). Using Bayes’ rule, Pr(S|X = x) = Pr(X =
x|S) · Pr(S)/Pr(X = x) and similarly for −G, leading to
R(x, S) =
Pr(X = x|S)
Pr(X = x| − S) ·
Pr(S)
Pr−S
Given that Pr(S) and Pr−S do not depend on t, the result follows.
Denote the conditional probability Pr(X = x|W ) by pit,W . Rewrite the likelihood ratio
as
pit,G
pit,−G
=
(pit,G − pit,−G) + pit,−G
pit,−G
from which result i) follows immediately. Moreover, it is clear that keeping the difference
pit,G − pit,−G fixed, the likelihood ratio decreases with the baseline probability pit,−G if and
only if the difference is positive.
Proposition 1. The likelihood ratio of type t is (up to a normalizing constant) equal to
pi1−αt,G . If α > 1, then this ratio decreases with the probability pit,G of t in G, so that the
representativeness ranking and the likelihood ranking of types for G are the opposite. This
proves case i). If α < 1, this ratio increases with pit,G, so that the representativeness ranking
and the likelihood ranking of types for G coincide. This shows the G part of cases ii) and
iii). If α > 0 the distributions for G and −G are co-monotonic so that −G is stereotyped by
its least likely types, while if α < 0 the distributions of G and −G have opposite likelihood
rankings of types, so that −G is stereotyped by its most likely types.
Proposition 2. Index the types t ∈ {1, . . . , N} according to the “natural” ordering relation
(e.g. type 1 is on the left and type T is on the right). Suppose the likelihood ratio pit,G/pit,−G
is monotonically decreasing in t. Then it follows that the average over G is lower than
the average over −G, and therefore lower than the unconditional average, E(t|G) < E(t).
Moreover, the ordering of types by representativeness coincides with the natural ordering of
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types, so that the stereotype consists of types 1 through d. By truncating the upper tail, it
follows that Est(t|G) < E(t|G).
If the the likelihood ratio is monotonically increasing in t, then the ordering of types by
representativeness coincides with the inverse of the natural ordering of types, so that the
stereotype consists of types N − d + 1 through N . By truncating the lower tail, it follows
that Est(t|G) > E(t|G) > E(t).
Proposition 3. We assume that the same number of observations are received at each stage
of the learning process for both groups G and −G. This assumption is not restrictive, since
only the relative frequency of observations matter. In particular, all probabilities remained
unchanged if the sample size of one group is scaled up relative to the sample size of the
other. Thus we can set
∑
t′ at′,G =
∑
t′ at′,−G = a and
∑
t′ nt′,G =
∑
t′ nt′,−G = n.
Representativeness of a type t is now measured by the ratio
Pr(X = x|αS,nS)
Pr(X = x|α−G,n−G) =
αt,G + nt,G
αt,−G + nt,−G
Consider case i) where all observations occur in type t, so that nt,G = n and nt′,G = 0 for
t′ 6= x, and similarly for −S. Then the representativeness of types other than t do not
change, while the representativeness of t is (αt,G + n)/(αt,−G + nt,−G). This tends to one
monotonically as n increases. Therefore, if at,G/at,−G < 1 then (at,G + n)/(at,−G + n) < 1
for all n: namely, if t is non-representative to begin with, then no amount of observations
of t in population G (when accompanied by observations of t in population −G) will make
t representative for G.
Consider now case ii), where all observations in G occur in a non-representative type
t while all observations in −G occur in a representative (for G) type t′. In that case, the
representativeness of t for group G increases as (at,G+n)/(at,−G), while the representativeness
of t′ for group G decreases as (at′,G + n)/(at′,−G + n). The result follows.
Proposition 4. Consider the case where a single observation of group G occurring in type
x does not change the representativeness ranking of types – and thus the stereotype – for G.
If t is in the stereotype of G, then its estimated probability is at,G/
∑d
t′=1 at′,G, which
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is boosted by a factor of
∑N
t′=1 at,G/
∑d
t′=1 at′,G > 1, where d is the number of types in the
stereotype. Suppose an observation occurs in type t. Its representativeness for G increases,
and its assessed probability jumps to (at,G+1)/(
∑d
t′=1 at′,G+1). This corresponds to a larger
increase of assessed probability than that done by a Bayesian whenever
at,G + 1∑d
t′=1 at′,G + 1
− at,G∑d
t′=1 at′,G
>
at,G + 1∑N
t′=1 at′,G + 1
− at,G∑N
t′=1 at′,G
namely when
at,G∑N
t′=1 at,G
<
∑d
t′=1 at,G
1 +
∑d
t′=1 at,G +
∑N
t′=1 at,G
<
1
2
The intuition is that the stereotype ignores some observations, it is as though the probability
is being updated over a smaller sample size. Therefore, as long as the prior of t (in the
stereotype) is not too large, the DM boosts it more than the Bayesian.
If t is not in the stereotype, then – given that the stereotype does not change – it does
not become representative. Its assessed probability stays at zero, so the decision maker
under-reacts to this observation relative to a Bayesian.
Proposition 5. Let ρµ,σ2 denote the probability density of N (µ, σ2), namely ρ(t) =
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
(t−µ)2
2σ2 . The exemplar tˆG of G ≡ N (µG, σ2G) relative to −G ≡ N (µ−G, σ2−G) satisfies
tˆE = argmaxt
ρ
µG,σ
2
G
ρ
µ−G,σ2−G
where
ρµG,σ2G
ρµ−G,σ2−G
=
σ−G
σG
· exp
{
−t2
(
1
2σ2G
− 1
2σ2−G
)
+ t
(
µG
σ2G
− µ−G
σ2−G
)
−
(
µ2G
2σ2G
− µ
2
−G
2σ2−G
)}
When σG < σ−G, the function above has a single maximum in t, namely that which
maximizes the parabola in the exponent, tˆE =
µG
σ2
G
−µ−G
σ2−G
1
σ2
G
− 1
σ2−G
from which the result follows.
When σG > σ−G, the function above is grows without bounds with |t|, so that tˆG ∈
{−∞,+∞}.
When σG = σ−G = σ, the exemplar tˆG of G ≡ N (µG, σ2) relative to −G ≡ N (µ−G, σ2)
satisfies
tˆG = argmaxte
−µ
2
G−µ
2
−G
2σ2 · e t2σ2 (µG−µ−G)
53
so that tˆG = −∞ if µG < µ−G and tˆG = +∞ otherwise. If µG < µ−G all values of t are
equally representative.
Proposition 6. Since the variances of the sample populations G and −G are equal, the
stereotypes are fully determined by the sample means. From Proposition 5, if
∑
t tG,k >∑
t t−G,k, then the sample mean of G is larger than that of −G, so that its exemplar is
tˆG = +∞. If instead
∑
t tG,k <
∑
t t−G,k, the exemplar of G is tˆG = −∞. Cases i) and ii)
follow directly from this.
Lemma 1. This follows from Proposition 5, and from the fact that a left (right) trun-
cated normal distribution satisfies the MLRP relative to the original distribution, where the
likelihood ratio is increasing (decreasing).
Lemma 2. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 1.
Proposition 7. Consider case i). Women believe they have lower ability, θstF < θstM . The
first order condition (11) implies that the optimal effort e∗F = e∗(θstF ) for any individual
woman to provide is below that of men. As a result, average skills for women θ + e∗F are
lower than average skills of men, thus confirming the stereotype. Symmetrically, men believe
they have higher ability, so it is individually optimal for a man to put a level of effort e∗M
which is higher than that of women, thus achieving higher skill levels and again confirming
the stereotype. Case ii) is the reverse.
Consider now case iii). If both men and women believe they have the same ability θ, then
it is individually optimal to provide the (rational) level of effort, which leads both groups
to have the same level of skills, thus confirming the stereotype. However, this equilibrium
is not stable: playing off the equilibrium path (due to heterogeneous beliefs, or mistakes)
destroys this equilibrium.
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B Unordered Types
In many settings, decision makers must assess groups in terms of their distributions over
unordered type spaces. For instance, one may be interested in the distribution of occupations,
or of political views, or of beliefs of different social groups. Our model applies directly to these
settings, provided the type space is specified, or at least implied, by the problem at hand.
While there is no notion of “extreme” types in unordered type spaces, the central insight about
how representativeness and likelihood combine to determine stereotype accuracy continues
to hold (Proposition 1): when groups are very similar, representative differences tend to
be relatively unlikely, while when groups are different representative differences tend to be
likely, and thus generate more accurate stereotypes.
To illustrate this logic in the context of unordered types, consider the formation of the
stereotypes “Republicans are creationists” and “Democrats believe in Evolution”. In May
2012, Gallup conducted a public opinion poll assessing the beliefs about Evolution of mem-
bers of the two main parties in the US. The results on the beliefs of Republicans and
Democrats, largely unchanged in the three decades over which such polls have been con-
ducted, are presented below:48
Creationism Evolution Evolution guided by God
Republicans 58% 5% 31%
Democrats 41% 19% 32%
The table shows that being a creationist is the distinguishing feature of the Republi-
cans, not only because most Republicans are creationist but also because more Republicans
are creationists than Democrats. In this sense, stereotyping a Republican as a creation-
ist yields a fairly accurate assessment. Formally, t = Creationism maximizes not only
Pr(Republicans|t)/Pr(Democrats|t) but also Pr(t|Republicans).
On the other hand, the distinguishing feature of the Democrats is to believe in the
“standard” Darwinian Evolution of humans, a belief four times more prevalent than it
48The three options were described as “God created Humans in present form in the last 10,000 years”,
“Humans evolved, God has no part in process” and “Humans evolved, God guided the process”. See
http://www.gallup.com/poll/155003/Hold-Creationist-View-Human-Origins.aspx for details.
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is among Republicans. However, and perhaps surprisingly, only 19% of Democrats be-
lieve in Evolution. Most of them believe either in creationism (41%) or in Evolution
guided by God (32%), just like Republicans do. Formally, t = Evolution maximizes
Pr(Democrats|t)/Pr(Republicans|t) but not Pr(t|Democrats). Evolution is not the most
likely belief of Democrats, but rather the belief that occurs with the highest relative fre-
quency. As a consequence, a stereotype-based prediction that a Democrat would believe in
the standard evolutionary account of human origins, and would not believe in Creationism,
is a bad prediction.49
C Multidimensional Types
In the real world, types are often multidimensional. Members of social groups vary in their
occupation, education, religion, income and other dimensions. Firms differ in their sector,
location and management style. The state of the economy includes GDP growth, interest
rates, and inflation. While multiple dimensions are subsumed in our previous analysis, in
which each of the N types may consist of a unique specification of a possibly large set
of attributes, for many groups stereotypes are formed along specific dimensions. Thus,
some social groups are stereotyped by their occupations (“immigrants work in menial jobs”),
others by their political views (“the young are liberal”), still others by their religious customs
(“Buddhists meditate”).50 How are these dimensions selected?
Our model of representativeness provides a parsimonious perspective on this issue: the
stereotype for group G will be organized around the dimension along which G is most
49Another example in this spirit is as follows. Suppose the DM must assess the time usage of Americans
and Europeans. For the sake of simplicity, we consider only two types, namely T = {time spent on work,
time spent on vacation}. The Americans work 49 weeks per year, so the conditional distribution of work
versus vacation time is {0.94, 0.06}. In contrast, the Europeans work 47 weeks per year, with work habits
{0.9, 0.1}. In both cases, work is by far the most likely activity. However, because the Americans’ work habits
are more concentrated around their modal activity, the stereotypical American activity is work. Because
Europeans have fatter vacation tails, their stereotypical activity is enjoying the dolce vita. This stereotype is
inaccurate, precisely because the vast majority of time spent by Europeans is at work. Still, due to its higher
representativeness, vacationing is the distinctive mark of Europeans, which renders the image of holidays
highly available when thinking of that group.
50As alluded to in Section 3.3, stereotypes may vary depending on circumstances according to changes
in the comparison group. Walking in a deserted neighborhood may evoke a crime-based stereotype, while
watching a sport event may evoke an athleticism-based stereotype for the same ethnic group.
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different from −G. To see what this means, consider an example in which social groups
in the US are described in terms of educational attainment (share of group members with
higher education degree) and demand for social services (share of group members on welfare).
Suppose that 35% of the white population has a college degree and 2% are on welfare, while
21% of the black population has a college degree and 10% are on welfare.51 In terms of
representativeness, the black population differs the most from the white population along
the welfare dimension, not along the educational attainment dimension. This follows from
the diminishing sensitivity of representativeness (Remark 1): even though the difference in
educational attainment is larger (79% of blacks versus 65% of whites without college degrees),
the most distinguishing feature of the black population is its higher relative demand for
welfare (10% versus 2%). In this sense, to be formalized below, the stereotype for the black
population is to be on welfare, despite the fact that only a small minority is on welfare (and
even if the higher share of blacks on welfare were partially driven by their lower rates of
college graduation). Conversely, the stereotype for whites is their higher share of graduates,
not the fact that fewer are on welfare, even though a minority of whites go to college and
a majority of whites are not on welfare. This is both because relatively more whites go
to college and because most blacks are also not on welfare. The example shows that when
groups are characterized by multidimensional types, they can be stereotyped along different
dimensions. In particular, due to diminishing sensitivity, both groups can be stereotyped
with unlikely types.
We now formalize the intuition described in this example. Suppose that the original
random variable t is the product two categorical variables Y and Z, where Y ∈ {1, . . . , NY }
and Z ∈ {1, . . . , NZ}, where NY , NZ > 1. In the previous notation, N = NY × NZ
is the number of types. Types are indexed by realizations (y, z) of the two variables.
According to Definition 1, the representativeness of type (y, z) for G is then defined by
Pr(y, z|S)/Pr(y, z| − S). In this setup, a stereotype consists of the d most representa-
tive realizations (y, z) of the two variables. To make progress, consider the special case in
which the representativeness of a realization of Z does not depend on that of Y , formally
51Data from the National Center for Education Statistics (http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d12/tables/dt12_008.asp)
and from Statistic Brain (http://www.statisticbrain.com/welfare-statistics/).
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Pr(z|y, S)/Pr(z|y,−S) = Pr(z|S)/Pr(z| − S) for all z and all y (an assumption implicit in
the previous example). The representativeness of type (y, z) is then an increasing function
of:
Pr(z|S)
Pr(z| − S) ·
Pr(y|S)
Pr(y| − S) . (14)
The representativeness of (y, z) is simply the product of the representativeness of y and
z considered independently. This condition holds, for instance, when being uneducated (low
y) is predictive of lower income (low z), but this correlation may be independent of group
identity and so acts uniformly across groups. Under this assumption, if one group has a
higher share of poor members, that must be because it has also a higher share of uneducated
members.
When equation (14) holds, the organization of a stereotype is pinned down by compar-
ing the variation in representativeness along the two dimensions Y and Z. Denote by yr
the r-th most representative type of Y , when representativeness for type y is defined by
Pr(y|S)/Pr(y| − S). If y1 is much more representative than y2, then type (y1, z) is more
representative than (y2, z′) for any z and z′. In this case, the stereotype intuitively becomes
“lexicographic,” in the sense that it allows for little variation in types of the highly represen-
tative dimension Y and for much more variation in types of the less representative dimension
Z. Specifically, the first NZ types that come to mind are combinations of y1 with all pos-
sible realizations of Z. The result below characterizes the cases in which this lexicographic
ranking arises.
Proposition 8 When (14) holds, the stereotype is lexicographic in dimension Y if:
min
r
[
Pr(yr|S)
Pr(yr| − S)/
Pr(yr+1|S)
Pr(yr+1| − S)
]
>
[
Pr(z1|S)
Pr(z1| − S)/
Pr(zNZ |S)
Pr(zNZ | − S)
]
, (15)
where vr denotes the r-th most representative realization v = y, z, when representativeness
for v is defined in isolation, formally Pr(vr|S)/Pr(vr| − S). In particular, the stereotype is
lexicographic in Y if Z is uninformative, Pr(z|S) = Pr(z| − S) for all z.
Equation (15) identifies a stark condition for the stereotype to be lexicographic, namely
that the maximum percentage variation in the likelihood ratio along Z is lower than the
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minimum variation along Y . Not only the ranking of Y types by representativeness matters,
but also how large an increase in representativeness is obtained by recalling y1 rather than
y2, and so on. In particular, the stereotype is lexicographic in Y when the non-diagnostic
dimension Z is undistinguishable across groups. When comparing Americans and Euro-
peans, stereotypes do not focus on particular age groups, in the sense that the stereotypical
European or American can be of a wide range of ages.
More importantly, however, Proposition 8 says that stereotypes can be organized along
a given dimension Y if each type along Y is sufficiently more representative than the next.
Remark 1 implies that representativeness of types becomes more extreme when the most
representative types are unlikely. This suggests, as in the previous example on the demand
for welfare, that Equation (15) tends to select bad stereotypes.
Proof. Following the assumptions of the proposition, write Pr(z|y, S) = Pr(z|S) · φ(x, y)
and Pr(z|y,−S) = Pr(z| − S) · φ(x, y). We now describe the most extreme way that the
stereotype may be organised along dimension Y , in which all variation along dimension Z
is taken into account, namely dZ = |NZ | (maximal) and dY = d/|NZ | (minimal). The
representativeness of type (y, z) is given by
Pr(z|y, S)
Pr(z|y,−S) ·
Pr(y|S)
Pr(y| − S) =
Pr(z|S)
Pr(z| − S) ·
Pr(y|S)
Pr(y| − S)
Because the representativeness of type (y, z) increases in the representativeness of y keeping
z fixed (and vice versa), it is useful to consider the ranking of (unconditional) types y ∈ Y
and z ∈ Z. Let yi (resp. zi) denote the i-th most representative type in Y (resp. Z). Then,
intuitively, the stereotype organises around Y if the variation in representativeness along the
entire Z dimension is smaller than the variation in representativeness between any two types
in Y . Formally, the representativeness ranking is lexicography if and only if
Pr(z1|S)
Pr(z1| − S)
/
Pr(z|CZ ||S)
Pr(z|CZ || − S)
< min
r
Pr(yr|S)
Pr(yr| − S)
/
Pr(yr+1|S)
Pr(yr+1| − S) .
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